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Does Crawford Provide a Stable
Foundation for Confrontation Doctrine?
Roger W. Kirst †
The United States Supreme Court presented a new
interpretation of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause
in Crawford v. Washington. 1 In his opinion for the Court,
Justice Scalia examined the historical background of the
Clause to determine the original meaning of its text. He
concluded from the historical record that the primary object of
the Clause was preventing the prosecution from using
testimonial hearsay. Justice Scalia rejected the interpretation
of the Court’s decision in Ohio v. Roberts 2 that allowed the
prosecution to use testimonial hearsay upon a judicial finding
that it was reliable. He concluded that testimonial hearsay can
be used by the prosecution only if the declarant is unavailable
to testify at trial and the defendant had a prior opportunity to
cross-examine the declarant.
The Court in Crawford unanimously reversed the state
judgment, but the Court was not unanimous in support of
Justice Scalia’s interpretation and application of the history of
confrontation.
Chief Justice Rehnquist concurred in the
judgment in an opinion joined by Justice O’Connor. 3 The Chief
Justice presented his own review of the historical record to
support his argument that Justice Scalia’s approach was based
on the wrong distinction, too categorical, and unnecessary to
decide the case. The Chief Justice did not argue that the
statement in Crawford was admissible. Nor did he argue for
the admissibility of any particular statement that might be
†
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Crawford, 541 U.S. at 69 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
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excluded under the testimonial interpretation presented by
Justice Scalia.
The impact of Crawford is not the result of what the
Court actually did. Its unanimous reversal of a conviction
based in part on a custodial statement of an accomplice who did
not testify at trial was consistent with the Court’s prior
Confrontation Clause decisions. 4 Justice Scalia used a new
label in describing the statement as testimonial hearsay, but
the Supreme Court had never allowed the prosecution to use
such hearsay without confrontation. Although Justice Scalia
listed several state and federal decisions that had interpreted
Roberts as allowing judicial screening for reliability to
overcome a lack of confrontation, 5 that interpretation of Roberts
had never been used by the Supreme Court to affirm a
conviction. The Chief Justice said he dissented from the
decision to overrule Roberts, 6 but Justice Scalia did not say
Roberts was overruled.
Instead, Justice Scalia included
Roberts among the Court’s cases in which the results were
largely consistent with the principles he derived from the
historical record. 7
The impact of Crawford comes from Justice Scalia’s
emphasis that the Confrontation Clause should be interpreted
according to its original meaning, his conclusion that
testimonial hearsay was at least the primary object of the Sixth
Amendment and perhaps its sole concern, and his suggestion
that the distinction between testimonial and nontestimonial
statements should be used to organize confrontation doctrine.
Justice Scalia emphasized the importance of this distinction by
commenting that it could be consistent with the Framers’
design to exempt nontestimonial statements from any
confrontation requirement. 8 Justice Scalia did not provide a
complete definition of a testimonial statement, and he did not
explain what the confrontation rule might be for
nontestimonial statements if there should be one. Those gaps
have left other courts to struggle as they try to rebuild
confrontation doctrine on Crawford’s combination of the
testimonial interpretation, original meaning, and history.
4

See Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S.

415 (1965).
5
6
7
8

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62-65.
Id. at 69 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
Id. at 58 (majority opinion).
Id. at 68.
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Confrontation doctrine does not have to be completely
rebuilt after Crawford, and it does not have to be rebuilt on the
basis of Crawford alone. Justice Scalia discussed most of the
Supreme Court’s prior confrontation cases when he explained
why the testimonial interpretation was not inconsistent with
the holdings in those cases. His statement that his objections
were directed only to the rationales in some decisions confirms
that most prior doctrine should be still valid after Crawford.
Part I of this Article will review the evolution of confrontation
doctrine in the Supreme Court in order to describe the preCrawford history that is essential to understanding Crawford
and its effect.
Crawford must be read carefully. All the cases Justice
Scalia used to illustrate the vice of the Roberts test were
decided by state and federal appellate courts; none were from
the Supreme Court. That means Crawford should have less
effect on the confrontation doctrine the Court had already
established even if it will require substantial changes in the
ways some other courts had been interpreting the Court’s
opinions. It is also important to recognize where Justice
Scalia’s effort to outline the full sweep of the testimonial
interpretation did not completely summarize all the limitations
and conditions of the Court’s confrontation doctrine. Part II of
this Article will review Crawford and identify areas where the
summary in Crawford is not necessarily a complete statement
of established confrontation doctrine.
Justice Scalia’s discussion of the original meaning of the
Confrontation Clause emphasized English common law. He
described the civil-law mode of criminal procedure and the use
of ex parte examinations as the practices used in the notorious
English treason cases, the practices invited by the English
Marian statutes, and the practices targeted by the English
right of confrontation. 9 Justice Scalia explained his reliance on
English history by declaring that the Confrontation Clause “is
most naturally read as a reference to the right of confrontation
at common law.” 10 Justice Scalia also described controversial
examination practices that were used in the Colonies and listed
the declarations of rights adopted around the time of the
Revolution that guaranteed a right of confrontation. 11 He

9
10
11

Id. at 50.
Id. at 54.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 47-48.
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connected the English history to the Sixth Amendment by
describing the English experience as the practices “the
founding-era rhetoric decried.” 12 He concluded that there could
not be a reliability exception for a statement that would be the
modern equivalent of an abuse at which the Confrontation
Clause was directed.
Justice Scalia used the historical opposition to ex parte
testimony as evidence that the original concern addressed by
the Clause was primarily or even exclusively testimonial
hearsay. 13 He did not present any founding-era evidence that
explicitly confirms that the Framers had no concern with
nontestimonial hearsay. Justice Scalia’s conclusion rests on
silence in the historical record.
Silence alone can be
misinterpreted if the record is read with an erroneous
assumption about the context. The question framed by Justice
Scalia was based on an implicit assumption that the purpose of
the Confrontation Clause was excluding some hearsay. He did
not discuss whether the Framers might have had a different
purpose. An alternative interpretation of the ratification
history that produced the Sixth Amendment is that the
Framers intended to protect confrontation; excluding hearsay
was only an effect and not its sole purpose. When the
ratification history is read without an assumption about the
question it will answer, the silence of the Framers about the
details of the hearsay rule suggests the original meaning was
not limited to testimonial hearsay. Part III of this Article will
discuss why the ratification history shows that the
Confrontation Clause is not a reference to the English common
law of hearsay; the Clause requires confrontation.
The ratification history also shows that the original
meaning of the Confrontation Clause did not include specific
confrontation rules. It would be more accurate to describe the
original meaning as a process in which the courts would
develop and apply rules that protect the right of confrontation.
The Supreme Court’s pre-Crawford opinions have provided a
foundation for this process by identifying two elements of the
right of confrontation. One element was described more than a
century ago in Mattox v. United States as the ability of the jury
to look at a witness and “judge by his demeanor upon the stand
and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is
12
13

Id. at 50.
Id.
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worthy of belief.” 14 Justice White in California v. Green
described the same element when he considered whether the
trier of fact had “a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of
the prior statement.” 15 That element also appeared in Dutton
v. Evans, 16 Mancusi v. Stubbs, 17 and Roberts v. Ohio. 18 The
Court in Mattox also described a second element of the right of
confrontation as the defendant’s opportunity for “testing the
recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness.” 19 More
recently, Justice Blackmun in Roberts described a purpose of
confrontation as “ensuring the defendant an effective means to
test adverse evidence.” 20 That element was also included in Lee
v. Illinois. 21 Together, these two elements define a purpose of
confrontation as protecting the defendant’s ability to contest
the evidence before the factfinder. Part IV of this Article will
describe how these two elements provide a foundation for
developing confrontation limits on hearsay evidence that are
consistent with the Framers’ purpose of protecting the right of
confrontation.
The history of confrontation doctrine in the Supreme
Court has been a search for an interpretation that is both
consistent with the historical record and readily usable in the
courtroom in a criminal trial.
That search has been
complicated by the inevitable distortion that is created as other
courts convert the Court’s doctrine to shorthand tests. The
idea of indicia of reliability discussed in Roberts provided too
little guidance when it was reduced to a reliability test. The
testimonial interpretation may also lead to distortions if
confrontation doctrine is refined using only the guidance found
in Crawford.
As trial and appellate courts develop the labels
presented in Crawford, they can rebuild confrontation doctrine
with workable tests that are consistent with the original
meaning of the Confrontation Clause if they ask whether the
defendant has an effective means to test adverse evidence and
whether the trier of fact has a satisfactory basis for evaluating
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895).
399 U.S. 149, 161 (1970).
400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970).
408 U.S. 204, 213 (1972).
448 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1980).
156 U.S. at 242.
448 U.S. at 65.
476 U.S. 530, 543 (1986).
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a statement. These two elements do not require judicial
balancing at trial for each statement. They permit the
appellate courts to define the types of statements a defendant
would be able to contest before the factfinder. The two
elements avoid the need to research arcane questions about
English common law. They draw attention to the actual word
in the Sixth Amendment, confronted, instead of requiring
inferences from a word that is not in the text, such as
testimony. The two elements are supported by the ratification
history that led to the Sixth Amendment. They are consistent
with the results of all the Court’s confrontation cases from
Reynolds v. United States 22 through Crawford. Of equal
importance, they help explain the results in those cases and
show how the Court’s decisions can be extended to cover new
facts. Focusing on the purpose of confrontation does not mean
prosecutors will never be able to use prior statements. This
focus identifies reasons a statement might be admissible even
though the defendant cannot confront the declarant at trial in
the usual manner of cross-examination, and reasons a court
should exclude some statements if the declarant is not
available for confrontation before the factfinder. Part V of this
Article will describe how the Court’s two elements of the
purpose of confrontation can be used to understand the
confrontation doctrine the Court had developed before
Crawford and to develop new confrontation rules for the
questions the Court left unanswered in Crawford.
I.

THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE IN THE SUPREME COURT

Crawford cannot be understood without considering the
history that preceded it. Any effort by the Supreme Court to
describe an overall theory of confrontation has been rather
recent as well as occasional. The Confrontation Clause was
adopted in 1791. For the next 174 years, the United States
Supreme Court applied it in only a few federal criminal cases. 23
Some of the Court’s opinions included comments about the
purpose of the Clause, 24 but no opinion tried to provide an
overall theory of confrontation. The Confrontation Clause
began to get more attention in 1965, when the Court held in
22

98 U.S. 145 (1878).
See, e.g., Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458, 467 (1900); Kirby v. United
States, 174 U.S. 47, 55 (1899); Mattox, 156 U.S. at 240; Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 158.
24
See infra notes 333-44 and accompanying text.
23
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Pointer v. Texas that a defendant in a state trial was entitled
“to be tried in accordance with the protections of the
confrontation guarantee of the Sixth Amendment” under the
standards that would govern a federal trial. 25 In his majority
opinion in Pointer, Justice Black followed the conventional
style by focusing on the facts; he did not describe an overall
theory of confrontation. That style allowed the Court to decide
Pointer and the next few cases 26 without the need to anticipate
every issue that might be raised by different facts, but it
provided little guidance for new fact situations. The search for
a more complete theory of the Confrontation Clause began in
1970.
A.

Justice Harlan’s Dilemma

The first effort by any Justice to describe an overall
scope and structure for the right of confrontation came in
Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion in California v. Green. 27
Green differed in two ways from every prior confrontation
decision of the Supreme Court. It was the first time the Court
reviewed a case in which another court had found a
confrontation violation, and it was the first time the Court
concluded that another court had read the Clause too broadly.
In Green, the California Supreme Court had interpreted the
Court’s then-recent confrontation decisions as requiring that
cross-examination occur at the same time as the statement was
The United States Supreme Court rejected the
made. 28
requirement of contemporaneous cross-examination and
reversed the state court. 29 In his majority opinion, Justice
White focused on two issues – when the prosecution could use
prior cross-examined testimony of an unavailable witness 30 and
when the prosecution could use a prior statement of a witness
who is subject to adequate cross-examination at trial. 31 He did
not try to describe a broader principle that would include both
specific rules.

25
26

380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965).
Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123

(1968).
27
28
29
30
31

399 U.S. 149, 172 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
People v. Green, 451 P.2d 422, 426 (Cal. 1969).
California v. Green, 399 U.S. at 164, 170.
Id. at 165-68.
Id. at 162-64, 168-70.
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In his concurring opinion, Justice Harlan wrote that
other courts needed more guidance than provided in Justice
White’s opinion and that it was important to dispel the
misconception that confrontation should be equated with crossJustice Harlan framed the question as
examination. 32
“whether and to what extent the Sixth Amendment
‘constitutionalizes’ the hearsay rule of the common law.” 33
Justice Harlan began his analysis in Green by
identifying two polar readings of the Confrontation Clause. At
one pole, the Clause would have little or no effect if it were
read “to confer nothing more than a right to meet face to face
all those who appear and give evidence at trial.” 34 At the other
pole, the Clause would have too much effect if it was
“interpreted as a blanket prohibition on the use of any hearsay
testimony.” 35 After rejecting both polar readings, Justice
Harlan still had to find a way to distinguish between
admissible hearsay and hearsay that would create a
constitutional violation.
Justice Harlan first identified a broad principle that did
not tie the Clause to the hearsay rule. He tentatively concluded
that the Clause was meant “to constitutionalize a barrier
against flagrant abuses, trials by anonymous accusers, and
absentee witnesses,” which would be supplemented by judicial
He proposed that the
application of evidence rules. 36
availability of the declarant should be the test for defining the
right of confrontation. 37 He then cataloged several Supreme
Court decisions in order to show that confrontation had not
been equated with cross-examination and that these holdings
supported the requirement that the prosecution produce any
available witness. 38
Later the same year, Justice Harlan decided that
making availability the sole and controlling principle for
confrontation doctrine would be a mistake. His approach in
Green would have meant there was a confrontation violation in
Dutton v. Evans, but Justice Harlan instead wrote another
concurring opinion to explain why he had provided the fifth
32
33
34
35
36
37
38

Id. at 172 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Id. at 173.
Id. at 175.
Green, 399 U.S. at 175.
Id. at 179 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Id. at 182-83.
Id. at 183.
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vote for rejecting the defendant’s confrontation argument. 39 In
his concurring opinion, Justice Harlan explained that he
thought a prosecutor should not have to produce every
available declarant because doing so would be both
inconvenient and sometimes of little value to a defendant. 40
His specific examples were official statements, learned
treatises, trade reports, business records, and laboratory
analyses. 41 He apparently could not resolve the dilemma he
had described in Green because he saw no way to reconcile the
admission of some hearsay with the “seemingly absolute
command” of the Confrontation Clause. 42 Therefore, he went
back to one of the polar readings he had rejected in Green and
concluded in Dutton that the Clause applied only to the “mode
of procedure,” not to whether the prosecutor could use hearsay
evidence. 43 He proposed as an alternative that state trials
should be governed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause instead of the Confrontation Clause. 44
At the time he wrote, Justice Harlan’s opinion in Green
was the most substantial discussion of the historical record of
the Confrontation Clause in any Supreme Court opinion. He
explained his inability to find more than “scant information” 45
in the historical record with the well-known comment that “the
Confrontation Clause comes to us on faded parchment.” 46 The
image generated by that comment persists long after the
statement has become false. The parchment is not faded. In
the decades since Green there has been extensive research into
every corner of confrontation doctrine. That research has
brought forth a substantial body of published material on the
history of confrontation in criminal procedure, about its history
as a political idea, about English and American criminal
procedure before and after the Revolution, and about the
adoption of the Confrontation Clause. 47

39

Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 93 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
Id. at 95-96.
41
Id. at 96.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 94, 95-96.
44
Id. at 96-97.
45
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 179 (1970) (Harlan, J. concurring).
46
Id. at 173-74.
47
See, e.g., 30 & 30A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1997 & 2000); Randolph N. Jonakait, The Origins
of the Confrontation Clause: An Alternative History, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 77 (1995).
40
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Justice Scalia’s opinion in Crawford described more of
the historical record than Justice Harlan had sketched in
Green, but Justice Scalia was trying to resolve the same
dilemma that Justice Harlan had framed in Green. Justice
Scalia was also trying to define the kind of hearsay the Clause
was meant to exclude. Crawford demonstrates that the search
for an overall theory of confrontation is still governed by
Justice Harlan’s approach to the text of the Clause, even
though no other Justice has ever endorsed his conclusions in
either Green or Dutton.
B.

Justice Blackmun’s Theory in Roberts

Justice Blackmun described his overall theory of
confrontation in nine paragraphs and six footnotes in Part II of
Roberts. 48 Given the widespread belief that this discussion
adopted a reliability test for applying the Confrontation
Clause, it is important to recognize its modest beginnings.
Part II does not appear to be the major focus of the Roberts
opinion. In fact, Justice Blackmun himself did not use the
theory he described in Part II to organize his discussion of the
specific issues in the case. Nor did Justice Blackmun use his
general theory when he explained the holding of Roberts in
Parts III and IV. Three Justices dissented in an opinion by
Justice Brennan on the specific issue of whether the declarant
had been shown to be unavailable. 49 That dissent did not
mention Justice Blackmun’s overall theory of confrontation. As
a result, Roberts itself provides little explanation of the rules
Justice Blackmun described. There is no apparent source in
any pre-Roberts opinion, book, or law review article for the
language Justice Blackmun used to describe his overall theory
in Part II. Nevertheless, there is still much that can be learned
from reading Roberts.
In Roberts, the defendant had been convicted of forgery,
receiving stolen property, and possession of heroin. 50 The
daughter of the victim was a possible witness on the forgery
and stolen property charges. Defense counsel had called her at
the preliminary hearing, apparently in the hope that she would
corroborate the defendant’s story that she had given him her
father’s property. That hope disappeared as the daughter’s
48
49
50

Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 62-68 (1980).
Id. at 77 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 58, 60.
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preliminary hearing testimony refuted the defendant’s story.
At the time of trial, the daughter could not be found; the
prosecution used her preliminary hearing testimony that had
been created by the defense. 51 By a vote of 4-3, the Ohio
Supreme Court held that using her prior testimony was a
confrontation violation even though the daughter was
unavailable. 52 The majority gave two reasons. The first was
that the issues and defense strategy are quite different
between a preliminary hearing and trial. 53 The second reason
was that Justice White’s opinion in California v. Green was not
controlling since the defense questioning of the witness in
Roberts was not cross-examination. 54
The Supreme Court rejected both conclusions of the
state court. In Part III of Roberts, Justice Blackmun identified
the controlling precedent as the section of Green in which the
Court permitted the prosecution to use the prior testimony of
an unavailable declarant. 55 Defense counsel had actually
questioned the witness in Roberts in a way that followed the
form and purpose of cross-examination without being limited
Justice Blackmun
by an objection or judicial ruling. 56
concluded Part III of Roberts by reemphasizing that there was
no reason to decide the issue differently than it had been
decided in Green. 57 In Part IV of Roberts, Justice Blackmun
concluded that the facts before the trial court were sufficient to
show that the daughter was unavailable. 58
The style and scope of Justice Blackmun’s analysis in
both Parts III and IV are completely consistent with his own
description of the Court’s “common law tradition” in which “the
process has been gradual, building on past decisions, drawing
on new experience, and responding to changing conditions.” 59
The holding in Parts III and IV resolved all the issues raised by
the parties. Justice Blackmun said that the Court would not
decide issues it did not have to reach. 60 He did not discuss
whether the opportunity to cross-examine would suffice by
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

Id. at 59-60.
State v. Roberts, 378 N.E.2d 492, 497 (Ohio 1978).
Id. at 496.
Id. at 497.
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 67-73.
Id. at 70-71.
Id. at 73.
Id. at 75-77.
Id. at 64.
Id. at 70.
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itself or whether de minimis cross-examination would be
enough. He described defense counsel’s questions to illustrate
that they were the equivalent of “significant cross
examination,” but he did not suggest any detailed standard for
Nevertheless,
the sufficiency of the prior examination. 61
Justice Blackmun preceded his analysis of the facts of Roberts
with Part II of his opinion in which he did not discuss the facts
at all.
Justice Blackmun began Part II by framing the issue as
“the relationship between the Confrontation Clause and the
hearsay rule with its many exceptions.” 62 He first considered
whether the language of the Clause should be read literally to
require the exclusion of any statement by an absent declarant,
but he labeled that interpretation as “long rejected as
Justice Blackmun then
unintended and too extreme.” 63
excluded the possibility that the right of confrontation might
have no effect on the use of hearsay, because the “historical
evidence leaves little doubt, however, that the Clause was
That discussion
intended to exclude some hearsay.” 64
considered and rejected the two polar readings Justice Harlan
had tried to reconcile in Green and Dutton, although Justice
Blackmun did not mention that Justice Harlan had previously
framed this issue.
Justice Blackmun’s restatement of the difficulty in
applying the constitutional text brought him to the point where
Justice Harlan had conceded in Dutton 65 that it was impossible
to draw a line between admissible statements and those that
would violate the right of confrontation.
Unlike Justice
Harlan, Justice Blackmun did not concede the task was
impossible. Instead he proposed expanding the set of rules.
His first rule was that in the usual case “the prosecution must
either produce, or demonstrate the unavailability of, the
declarant.” 66 Justice Blackmun then added a refinement that
would allow the prosecution to use only statements by
unavailable declarants that had adequate indicia of
reliability. 67 He described the indicia of reliability as sufficient
61
62
63
64
65
66
67

Roberts, 448 U.S. at 70-71.
Id. at 62.
Id. at 63.
Id.
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65.
Id. at 66.
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to overcome a confrontation objection if the statement falls
“within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.” 68 Finally, he
suggested a rule for the hearsay that did not fit within a firmly
rooted exception: “In other cases, the evidence must be
excluded, at least absent a showing of particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness.” 69
Justice Blackmun supported his statement that certain
hearsay exceptions do not create a confrontation violation with
a footnote that listed two Supreme Court decisions that had
discussed dying declarations, 70 one Court decision that had
allowed the prosecution to use the cross-examined prior-trial
testimony of an unavailable witness, 71 and a law review
comment that had endorsed the hearsay exception for business
He broadened his authority with
and public records. 72
quotations from Green and Dutton about the similar roots and
values of hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause. 73 Justice
Blackmun did not discuss whether his earlier statement of a
categorical rule that the declarant must be unavailable was
consistent with his suggestion that business records would
always bear adequate indicia of reliability. The purpose of the
business records exception would be lost if the prosecution had
to call every person who made the records, but Justice
Blackmun did not discuss why his confrontation rules made it
harder for a prosecutor to use business records by requiring
both unavailability and indicia of reliability.
Justice
Blackmun
provided
no
examples
of
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. The very lengthy
footnote attached to that statement contained only his review
of the scholarly commentary and concluded that its “mutually
critical character” meant that the Court should continue with
what he described as its “demonstrated success in steering a
middle course.” 74 Equally important, Justice Blackmun did not
state that particularized guarantees of trustworthiness would
allow the prosecution to use a prior statement. His language is
68

Id.
Id.
70
Id. at 66 n.8 (citing Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407 (1965); Mattox, 156
U.S. at 243-44).
71
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 n.8 (citing Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 213-16
(1972)).
72
J. Brooks Greer, III, Comment, Hearsay, the Confrontation Clause, and
Related Problems, 30 LA. L. REV. 651, 668 (1970).
73
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
74
Id. at 68 n.9.
69
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phrased carefully to require exclusion if there are no
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness, but it does not
say they will be sufficient. That phrasing left the question of
whether anything else might provide indicia of reliability for
future decisions.
The “indicia of reliability” label had a short and varying
history before Justice Blackmun used it in Roberts. A closer
look into how the phrase got its start is required to determine
whether Justice Blackman used it in the reliability-only sense
that Justice Scalia attacked so strongly in Crawford. Justice
White first used the phrase in Green to describe state hearsay
rules that violated the right of confrontation. 75 Next, Justice
Stewart used the phrase in Dutton in a different sense when he
summarized the reasons the hearsay statement in the case
could be admitted without confrontation. 76 The label had been
first used as a test in the way it was used in Roberts by thenJustice Rehnquist in Mancusi v. Stubbs. 77
In Mancusi, the hearsay was testimony from a prior
trial that had been given by a witness who had later returned
to Sweden 78 and was unwilling to return for the second trial. 79
Justice Rehnquist used the “indicia of reliability” phrase from
Dutton in describing what the Court’s decisions had required to
afford “the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the
truth of the prior statement.” 80 He cited the opinion in
California v. Green for that standard. 81 Justice Rehnquist then
reviewed the facts and concluded that the opportunity to crossexamine and the actual cross-examination at the first trial
meant that the transcript “bore sufficient indicia of reliability
and afforded the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating
the truth of the prior statement.” 82
Justice Blackmun’s holding in Roberts applied exactly
the same rule Justice Rehnquist had stated and followed in
Mancusi. In Part III of Roberts, Justice Blackmun rejected a
defense argument that the Court should weigh the inherent

75

California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 161 (1970).
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970).
77
408 U.S. 204, 216 (1972) (quoting Dutton, 400 U.S. at 89).
78
Id. at 209.
79
Id. at 212.
80
Id. at 213 (quoting Dutton, 400 U.S. at 89).
81
Id. (citing Green, 399 U.S. at 161).
82
Mancusi, 408 U.S. at 216 (quoting Dutton, 400 U.S. at 89) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
76
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reliability or unreliability of the hearsay. 83 Instead, Justice
Blackmun said that the adequate opportunity to cross-examine
the witness and the actual examination meant that the
transcript “bore sufficient indicia of reliability and afforded the
trier of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the
prior statement.” 84
Justice Blackmun’s general approach in Part II of
Roberts did not call for a “mere judicial determination of
reliability,” as Justice Scalia described it in Crawford. 85 In
Roberts, Justice Blackmun used the full phrase of “indicia of
reliability” four times in three paragraphs. 86 Only in the
concluding reference to firmly rooted hearsay exceptions did he
shorten the phrase to “reliability.” 87 He described “indicia of
reliability” by quoting Justice Rehnquist’s language from
Mancusi that included the trier of fact’s basis for evaluating
the statement. 88 Justice Blackmun included an explanation of
the underlying purpose of the Clause:
“Reflecting its
underlying purpose to augment accuracy in the factfinding
process by ensuring the defendant an effective means to test
adverse evidence.” 89
The propositions that confrontation requires that the
defendant be able to test adverse evidence and that the trier of
fact have a basis for evaluating the truth of a statement do not
obviously lead to the conclusion that the Clause requires only
judicial screening for reliability. The Roberts test Justice
Scalia rejected in Crawford was well-removed from its 1980
source.
The language of Roberts should be read in the context of
1980, the year the case was decided. At the time of Roberts the
Federal Rules of Evidence were still new. Their eventual
adoption in 1975 led to a new attitude about the hearsay rule.
At the very least, the Federal Rules of Evidence were intended
to remove many of the limits of the hearsay rule by defining
new hearsay exceptions and expanding existing hearsay
exceptions.
In addition, the Federal Rules of Evidence

83
84

Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 72-73 (1980).
Id. at 73 (quoting Mancusi, 408 U.S. at 216) (internal quotation marks

omitted).
85
86
87
88
89

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004).
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65-66.
Id. at 66.
Id. at 73.
Id. at 65.
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produced a different way of thinking about the hearsay rule.
Under the common law hearsay rule, a prosecutor in a criminal
case could not expect to use many out-of-court statements. The
prosecutor had to find the witnesses, get them to court, have
them testify, and allow the defense to cross-examine. That
requirement could be avoided only if the prosecution could use
one of the few hearsay exceptions. The Supreme Court’s early
decisions applying the Confrontation Clause to state
prosecutions did not require a complete theory of confrontation
for every fact situation. 90 The Justices recognized that the
state prosecutors using accomplice statements were taking
shortcuts instead of getting the witnesses to testify as they
should.
One obvious effect of the Federal Rules of Evidence is
that codification has made the hearsay exceptions more
accessible. Another effect is that the hearsay exceptions can be
read like a code – as no more than literal categories that can be
applied without evaluating the policy implications each time
they are applied. The hearsay exceptions can be quickly
expanded by amendments that may appear justified on the
basis of assumed and limited facts, instead of being developed
slowly and incrementally on the basis of the varied facts of a
succession of cases. The wisdom of codification is not the issue
here.
Its effects, however, should not be ignored when
evaluating what Justice Blackmun may have been trying to do
in Roberts in 1980.
C.

Confrontation Doctrine after Roberts

In the following decades, the Supreme Court did not
consistently use Justice Blackmun’s overall theory. Instead,
the Court gave more attention to deciding each case by focusing
on its facts. The rule in Roberts that any declarant must be
shown to be unavailable was set aside as too broad. The
language in Roberts about a firmly rooted hearsay exception
was cited in cases that provided illustrations of hearsay
exceptions that were firmly rooted, but no opinion tried to
catalogue every exception that was firmly rooted. The Court
used the Roberts framework and discussed particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness only in cases that reversed
convictions, so the Court never identified any facts where the
90

See Pointer, 380 U.S. at 406.
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guarantees were sufficient to admit the hearsay. The following
sections summarize these cases because their details are
important to assessing whether Crawford presented an
accurate and complete description of the effect of Roberts.
1. Unavailability
Justice Blackmun’s first rule about unavailability was
quickly abandoned in the Court’s first confrontation case after
Roberts. The issue in United States v. Inadi 91 was whether the
prosecution could use statements under the co-conspirator
exception without showing that the declarant was
unavailable. 92 The Third Circuit had reversed the conviction on
the ground that Roberts did not include any exception for coconspirator statements in its statement of the unavailability
requirement. 93 The first task Justice Powell addressed in his
opinion for the majority was rejecting Roberts as controlling
precedent. 94 He described Roberts as deciding only whether
preliminary hearing testimony could be used without
confrontation at trial. 95 He cited Justice Blackmun’s disclaimer
of “any intention of proposing a general answer to the many
difficult questions arising out of the relationship between the
He concluded that
Confrontation Clause and hearsay.” 96
Roberts “must be read consistently with the question it
answered, the authority it cited, and its own facts.” 97
After Justice Powell set aside Roberts, he discussed
whether a co-conspirator statement could be admitted over a
confrontation objection even if the declarant was available. 98
He distinguished a co-conspirator statement from prior
testimony and described the context of the conspiracy as
making a co-conspirator statement “usually irreplaceable as
substantive evidence.” 99 He then concluded that a statement of
a co-conspirator could be used by the prosecution even if the
declarant was available to testify. 100
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100

475 U.S. 387 (1986).
Id. at 388.
United States v. Inadi, 748 F.2d 812, 818 (1984), rev’d, 475 U.S. 387 (1986).
Inadi, 475 U.S. at 392.
Id. at 392-93.
Id. at 392.
Id. at 394.
Id. at 394-96.
Id. at 396.
Inadi, 475 U.S. at 400.
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Justice Marshall, writing for himself and Justice
Brennan, argued in dissent that the Court had intended in
Roberts to establish an analytical framework that would be
applicable to all out-of-court statements. 101 Justice Blackmun
joined Justice Powell’s opinion for the majority; he did not
comment on Justice Powell’s treatment of Roberts. The only
issue in Inadi was whether the prosecution had to show that
the declarant was unavailable, so there was no need to
interpret any more of the language in Roberts.
The second time the Court considered the unavailability
rule of Roberts came in White v. Illinois. 102 In White, the
evidence of a sexual assault included three statements by the
victim at the scene that were admitted under the exception for
a spontaneous declaration and statements by the victim at the
hospital that were admitted under the medical examination
exception. 103 The victim did not testify, but the trial judge was
not asked to find that the victim was unavailable. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari only on the confrontation
issue, so it assumed that the evidence fit each hearsay
exception. 104 In his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice
Rehnquist rejected the defense assertion that Roberts required
the prosecution to show the declarant was unavailable. He
repeated the analysis from Inadi that had limited the authority
of Roberts on unavailability to cases involving prior
testimony. 105 The Chief Justice then concluded that there was
no reason apart from Roberts to require that the declarant be
unavailable if a prior statement was admitted under an
established hearsay exception. 106 The result in White confirmed
the statement in Inadi that the Court would not apply Justice
Blackmun’s general approach in Roberts to every confrontation
issue.
2. A Firmly Rooted Hearsay Exception
Justice Blackmun’s rule about a firmly rooted hearsay
exception was not rejected in later Court cases in the same way
as his rule about unavailability, but it was not consistently
101
102
103
104
105
106

Id. at 402-03 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
502 U.S. 346 (1992).
Id. at 350-51.
Id. at 351 & n.4.
Id. at 353-54.
See id. at 354-57.
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applied either. In Bourjaily v. United States the prosecution
had used recorded co-conspirator statements by the defendant’s
accomplice to an FBI agent. 107 The accomplice did not testify. 108
In his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded
that the recording was admissible. 109 He cited Inadi as having
held that the unavailability rule in Roberts did not apply to a
co-conspirator statement and described Roberts as “only ‘a
general approach.’” 110 Then he rejected the argument that the
trial judge should have screened the statements for reliability
using a quotation from Roberts that stated that an independent
inquiry into reliability is not required if the hearsay exception
is firmly rooted. 111 He did not define the category of firmly
rooted exceptions. Instead, he demonstrated that the Court
had long considered co-conspirator statements as not being
excluded by the hearsay rule. 112 The Chief Justice never
directly discussed why co-conspirator statements were not
excluded by the Confrontation Clause. In his opinion he
assumed that to be the rule and ended the discussion after
explaining why Roberts had not altered the continued validity
of that rule. 113
Chief Justice Rehnquist also discussed firmly rooted
hearsay exceptions in his opinion for the Court in White v.
Illinois, but he did not consider how the term might have been
defined in Roberts. 114 The issue in White was whether the trial
judge had to find that the declarant was unavailable before the
prosecution could introduce a spontaneous statement or a
statement for medical diagnosis. 115 The Chief Justice rejected
the defense argument that Roberts required unavailability; he
said that issue had been settled by Inadi’s limitation of Roberts
to its particular facts. 116 In discussing the reasons apart from
Roberts why unavailability should not be required, the Chief
Justice described firmly rooted exceptions as having sufficient
indicia of reliability. 117 That supported his conclusion that the
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117

483 U.S. 171 (1987).
Id. at 182.
Id. at 181.
Id. at 182.
Id. at 183.
Id. at 183.
Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 182-84.
White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 355-57, 355 n.8 (1992).
Id. at 348-49.
Id. at 353-54.
Id. at 355 n.8.
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Confrontation Clause did not require unavailability because
such a requirement would exclude statements with substantial
probative value. 118
White never proposed that the trial judge would test any
specific statement for indicia of reliability. The Chief Justice
instead described indicia of reliability as sufficient for any
statement that fit the two firmly rooted exceptions considered
in White. 119 This discussion of firmly rooted hearsay exceptions
does not lead to the individualized judicial screening of
reliability that Justice Scalia rejected in Crawford. The Chief
Justice referred only to the weight the context of any excited
statement might have for the trier of fact and the guarantees of
credibility for any statement for medical treatment that might
be considered by the trier of fact. 120
3. Particularized Guarantees of Trustworthiness
The Court’s treatment of the third rule in Justice
Blackmun’s general approach in Roberts falls in the middle
between its rejection of his rule on availability and its favorable
references to firmly rooted hearsay exceptions. The Supreme
Court never found that any statement had particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness that would allow the hearsay to
be admitted without confrontation, but two different Justices
created the appearance that there are such statements by
using that part of Roberts to organize the majority decision in
two separate cases. In both Lee v. Illinois 121 and Idaho v.
Wright 122 the Court rejected arguments by state prosecutors
that the particular statement in each case could be used
because it was reliable hearsay, but the Court did not
completely negate the possibility that other facts might lead to
a different result. The Court as well did not reject the idea
that the right of confrontation could be overcome by showing
that a statement was reliable.
In Lee v. Illinois, the defendant’s conviction was based
in part on the confession of an accomplice who did not testify. 123
As a result, the defendant never had a chance to cross-examine
118
119
120
121
122
123

Id. at 356-57.
Id. at 355 n.8.
White, 502 U.S. at 355-56.
476 U.S. 530 (1986).
497 U.S. 805 (1990).
Lee, 476 U.S. at 536, 538.
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the accomplice. In his majority opinion, Justice Brennan
quoted the statement in Roberts that the purpose of the Clause
is to augment accuracy “by ensuring the defendant an effective
In dissent, Justice
means to test adverse evidence.” 124
Blackmun quoted language that had first been used in
California v. Green when he declared that the mission of the
Clause is to assure that “the trier of fact [has] a satisfactory
basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement”; 125 that
statement used the same language he had quoted in Roberts. 126
Neither Justice, however, gave those terms any further
mention. Both opinions discussed only whether the accomplice
statement was reliable. Justice Brennan rejected the State’s
argument that the accomplice statement was factually
interlocking with the defendant’s own statement; for that
reason he found that using the statement violated the
He did not discuss
defendant’s right of confrontation. 127
whether the defendant would have had an opportunity to test
the statement. Similarly, Justice Blackmun’s argument that
the accomplice statement was reliable did not discuss whether
the factfinder would have a basis for evaluating its truth.
The debate between the majority and dissent in Lee
appeared to be framed around the assumption that the
prosecution could use an accomplice statement if it were
sufficiently reliable, even though the defendant never had an
opportunity to examine the declarant. As Justice Scalia noted
in Crawford, the Court’s reversal of the state decision in Lee
meant that the Court did not hold that reliability alone would
suffice. 128
The first reference to Lee in a Supreme Court opinion
came in New Mexico v. Earnest. 129 As in Lee, the conviction in
Earnest was based on a confession of an accomplice the
defendant did not cross-examine. 130 In a Per Curiam opinion,
the Court vacated the state judgment and remanded for further
Then-Justice
proceedings not inconsistent with Lee. 131
124

Id. at 543 (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980)).
Id. at 548 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 161 (1970)).
126
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1980) (quoting Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408
U.S. 204, 213 (1972), quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 161 (1970)).
127
Id. at 545-46.
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See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 58-59 (2004).
129
477 U.S. 648 (1986).
130
New Mexico v. Earnest, 703 P.2d 872, 875 (1985).
131
New Mexico v. Earnest, 477 U.S. at 648.
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Rehnquist gave more guidance in a concurring opinion that
described Lee as establishing that an opportunity for crossexamination was not always required. 132 He described Lee as
setting out a test for determining the admissibility of a
codefendant’s confession that is factually interlocking with the
defendant’s own confession. 133 In his brief opinion he did not
describe Lee as having established that the test was a general
standard of reliability. Whether or not Justice Rehnquist’s
concurrence in Earnest was an accurate summary of the
meaning of Lee, that interpretation was not presented in
Crawford. Both Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist
agreed that the statement in Crawford was inadmissible
without mentioning Earnest.
Justice Blackmun’s general approach in Roberts
appeared again in Idaho v. Wright. 134 In Wright, the hearsay
statements were made by a two-and-a-half-year-old victim two
days after the victim’s older sister had reported sexual abuse in
the family. 135 The declarant made the statements to an
examining pediatrician after police and welfare officials took
her into custody. 136 The trial court admitted the hearsay under
the state’s residual hearsay exception. 137 The Idaho Supreme
Court reversed after finding that the hearsay did not fit any
traditional hearsay exception and that it lacked particularized
In the United States
guarantees of trustworthiness. 138
Supreme Court, the State argued that the totality of
circumstances
provided
particularized
guarantees
of
trustworthiness; the State relied on both the circumstances of
how the statement was made and other evidence that
corroborated the truth of the statement. 139
Justice O’Connor wrote the majority opinion in Wright
that affirmed the conclusion of the state court that admitting
the victim’s statement violated the right of confrontation.
Justice O’Connor, however, did not endorse the reasoning of
the state court that the constitutional flaw was the lack of
procedural safeguards. 140 She rejected the argument of the
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140

Id. at 649 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
Id. at 649 n.*.
497 U.S. 805 (1990).
Id. at 809.
Id.
Id. at 811.
State v. Wright, 775 P.2d 1224, 1230-31 (1989), aff’d, 497 U.S. 805 (1990).
See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 819 (1990).
Id. at 818-19.
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prosecution that the statement could be used if other evidence
corroborated the truth of the statement. 141 She did accept the
argument that particularized guarantees of trustworthiness
could be factors that “relate to whether the child declarant was
particularly likely to be telling the truth.” 142 She amplified the
focus on whether the statement was truthful by describing
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness as “relevant
circumstances . . . that surround the making of the statement
and that render the declarant particularly worthy of belief.” 143
Although Justice O’Connor did not say that her opinion
in Wright was intended to replace Roberts, she did discuss the
reliability of the statement in a way that appeared to go beyond
Roberts. Justice O’Connor defined the issue as whether the
statement
had
“particularized
guarantees
of
144
She defined proper guarantees as ones
trustworthiness.”
that surround the making of the statement, and she rejected
any use of corroboration of the facts by other evidence. 145 The
common theme that tied her discussion together was
reliability. Justice O’Connor applied these tests and found that
only two of the factors stated by the trial court related to the
circumstances of the making of the statement – whether a twoand-a-half-year-old child would have a motive to make up such
a story of sexual assault and whether one would expect a child
of that age to fabricate a statement about sexual abuse. 146
Those two factors were not enough to allow the statement to be
used. It is possible to conclude from Justice O’Connor’s opinion
that the child’s statement could have been used if there had
been more facts supporting admissibility, but that is only one
possible inference from Justice O’Connor’s analysis.
None of the Justices in Wright disagreed with Justice
O’Connor’s focus on the reliability of the hearsay.
The
dissenting opinion by Justice Kennedy accepted Justice
O’Connor’s premise that the issue was whether the hearsay
was trustworthy. 147 Justice Kennedy argued only that the
Court should not reject corroboration; he thought that judges
should be able to use corroborating evidence to find that the
141
142
143
144
145
146
147

Id. at 819.
Id. at 822.
Id. at 819.
Id. at 822.
Wright, 497 U.S. at 822.
Id. at 826.
Id. at 827 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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hearsay was trustworthy. 148 Justice Blackmun joined Justice
Kennedy’s dissenting opinion without comment, so he did not
discuss whether Justice Kennedy had correctly interpreted
Roberts.
In Crawford, Justice Scalia distinguished Lee from the
possible inferences that could be drawn from Justice Brennan’s
opinion. 149 Justice Scalia could have interpreted Wright in the
same way in Crawford, but he did not. Instead, he ignored
Wright completely.
Justice Scalia had joined Justice
O’Connor’s majority opinion in Wright but he did not mention
Wright even though he otherwise listed all the Court’s
confrontation cases as generally faithful to the original
meaning of the Confrontation Clause. 150
A careful reading of Wright shows that even the focus on
reliability in Justice O’Connor’s opinion does not compel the
conclusion that a hearsay statement could be admitted “upon a
mere finding of reliability” of the particular declarant’s
statement. None of the factors Justice O’Connor said could be
used required the trial judge to evaluate the trustworthiness or
reliability of the particular declarant. Each factor began with
the undisputed fact that the declarant was two-and-a-half
years old and then considered the knowledge and reasoning
capacity of any child of that age. The factors that did relate to
the trustworthiness or reliability of the particular declarant
were those that Wright said could not be used.
Wright may have had more impact than Roberts in
creating the appearance that the Confrontation Clause could be
satisfied by a judicial finding of reliability. Even Justice Scalia
described the issue in those terms in 1990. In Maryland v.
Craig, announced on the same day as Idaho v. Wright, Justice
Scalia dissented from the decision to allow a child witness in a
sexual abuse trial to testify by closed circuit television. 151 In
the course of arguing that the Confrontation Clause should be
applied literally to require face-to-face confrontation of every
witness who testified, Justice Scalia discussed the application
of the Clause to hearsay evidence. 152 He described the limits on
hearsay as necessary to prevent the prosecution from
subverting the right of confrontation by calling a witness to
148
149
150
151
152

Id. at 828.
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 58-59 (2004).
Id. at 57-59.
497 U.S. 836, 860 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 863.
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repeat a hearsay statement. 153 Justice Scalia summarized the
Court’s opinions as “focused upon whether the reliability of the
hearsay statements (which are not expressly excluded by the
Confrontation Clause) ‘is otherwise assured.’” 154
Justice Scalia’s summary of confrontation doctrine in
Craig may not seem accurate after Crawford, but the summary
was not central to his opinion. In 1990, no Justice was trying
to provide a substitute for Roberts. They had no reason to do so
because the Court had not been consistently treating Roberts
as the foundation for confrontation doctrine. For similar
reasons, Wright should not be read as a new foundation but
rather as another instance of the Court developing
confrontation doctrine on a case-by-case basis. The result is
more important than each detail in the discussion. The holding
in Wright could have been described in Crawford as not
inconsistent
with
Crawford’s
interpretation
of
the
Confrontation Clause, even if the Court no longer endorses all
the inferences that could be drawn from Wright.
D.

The History of the Testimonial Interpretation

Justice Scalia’s dissent in Maryland v. Craig is
important for a second reason. It was the first appearance of a
key part of what eventually became the testimonial
interpretation of the Confrontation Clause in Crawford. There
was no hearsay issue in Craig because the victim testified; the
only issue was the use of closed-circuit television. In her
majority opinion, Justice O’Connor concluded that a trial judge
could permit the use of television on a finding of necessity. 155 In
discussing that question, she surveyed both the Court’s
confrontation cases that had involved hearsay and its
confrontation cases that had involved trial procedure. 156
Justice O’Connor then concluded from both sets of precedent
that something less than face-to-face confrontation at trial
would suffice if “necessary to further an important public policy
and only where the reliability of the testimony is otherwise
assured.” 157
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Id. at 865.
Id.
Id. at 860 (majority opinion).
Id. at 844-50.
Craig, 497 U.S. at 850.
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In his dissent, Justice Scalia argued that the Court’s
confrontation cases on the use of hearsay involved a different
issue from its cases on trial procedure. 158 He did not contest
Justice O’Connor’s summary of the hearsay cases because he
was making a different point.
He argued that the
confrontation rules about hearsay were based on a limitation
that was implicit in the Confrontation Clause. His point was
that the requirement of face-to-face confrontation was explicit
and therefore stronger than the implicit limitation on hearsay.
Part of his reasoning was that the language of the Sixth
Amendment gave a defendant the right to be confronted by the
“witnesses against him,” a phrase Justice Scalia interpreted as
meaning all those who give testimony at trial. 159
The next step in the evolution of the testimonial
interpretation came two years later in White v. Illinois 160 when
the United States submitted an Amicus Curiae brief in support
of the State. 161 That brief argued that the Confrontation Clause
did not impose any limits on the prosecution’s use of the
particular hearsay in the case – an excited utterance and a
statement to medical personnel for the purpose of medical
treatment. 162 It cited Justice Scalia’s dissent in Craig for the
proposition that the Clause applied only to those who provide
testimony at trial or its functional equivalent and argued that
neither statement had been made by such a “witness against”
the defendant. 163
The United States described this interpretation as an
intermediate position between the two polar readings Justice
Harlan had described in Green. 164 This interpretation did not
limit the Confrontation Clause to the witnesses who actually
appear, but it did not extend the Clause to every hearsay
At the heart of this interpretation was a
statement. 165
definition of the functional equivalent of in-court testimony as
“affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or other statements
(such as confessions) that are made with a view to legal
158

Id. at 863 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 862.
160
502 U.S. 346 (1992).
161
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent,
White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992) (No. 90-6113).
162
Id. at 21.
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Id. at 18 (citing Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 864 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
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Id. at 19-20 & 19 n.10.
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proceedings.” 166
The United States did not offer this
interpretation in an effort to expand the protection offered by
the Confrontation Clause to defendants; its Amicus Brief in
support of the State of Illinois was an effort to substantially
reduce the scope of the Clause.
Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected the interpretation
offered by the United States in his majority opinion in White.
He described the interpretation as a narrow reading that would
limit the effect of the Confrontation Clause to ex parte
affidavits or similar statements “made for the principal
purpose of accusing or incriminating the defendant.” 167 The
Chief Justice said that the Court would continue on its middle
course that did not equate hearsay with confrontation even
though it allowed hearsay within an established exception to be
used without confrontation. 168
Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion in White,
joined by Justice Scalia, that also described the interpretation
offered by the United States as a narrow reading of the
Confrontation Clause. 169 Justice Thomas argued that the
Court’s analysis of confrontation doctrine under the two
standards defined in Roberts implied that “the Confrontation
He suggested
Clause bars only unreliable hearsay.” 170
replacing the distinction between reliable and unreliable
hearsay with a distinction between testimonial materials and
all other hearsay. 171 Justice Thomas surveyed the history of
the Sixth Amendment and concluded that it did not seem likely
that the drafters intended to allow the prosecution to use an ex
parte affidavit just because it was reliable. 172 He did not
suggest that the Sixth Amendment history provided a single
definition of testimonial materials. Instead, he said only that
“[o]ne possible formulation” was “affidavits, depositions, prior
testimony, or confessions.” 173 The hearsay involved in White
did not fall into any of those categories, so Justice Thomas
could state that the Court had reached the correct result by
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Id. at 18-19.
White, 502 U.S. at 352 (majority opinion).
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Id. at 363.
Id. at 365.
Id. at 363.
White, 502 U.S. at 365.

62

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:1

allowing the prosecution to use excited utterances and a
statement for medical diagnosis.
E.

The Prelude in Lilly v. Virginia

Following White, the Supreme Court took a seven-year
break from debating confrontation doctrine.
In Lilly v.
Virginia, the Court considered whether the Confrontation
Clause permitted the prosecution to use an entire confession of
an accomplice that contained some statements against penal
interest and other statements that accused the defendant. 174
The state court had rejected the defendant’s confrontation
argument after concluding that the statement was a statement
against penal interest and that the penal interest exception
was firmly rooted under state law. 175 The Supreme Court was
unanimous that admitting the statement was a confrontation
violation, but none of the five opinions was supported by a
majority. Each opinion suggested a different way of organizing
confrontation doctrine.
Justice Stevens organized the analysis in his lead
opinion around Roberts. 176 He began by assuming that the
assertion of the Fifth Amendment by the accomplice made his
trial testimony unavailable. 177 Justice Stevens described the
test in Roberts as allowing such a statement if it fit a firmly
rooted hearsay exception or contained particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness. 178 On the first test, he stated
conclusively that an accomplice confession inculpating the
defendant was not within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. 179
If such a statement were to be admitted it could only be under
the second test, a test that was not met under the facts before
the Court. 180 The analysis by Justice Stevens might have made
Roberts the foundation of confrontation doctrine, but Justice
Stevens was not writing for a majority. The five Justices who
did not join his opinion made clear that they did not agree with
his reliance on Roberts.
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Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the second-largest
grouping of three Justices. 181 He did not object to using the two
Roberts tests, but he did not agree with the application of
either test by Justice Stevens to the facts before the Court.
The Chief Justice did not dissent from the holding that the
state court had permitted the prosecution to use hearsay
evidence that violated the Confrontation Clause. His first
objection was that the Court did not need to categorically
exclude all accomplice confessions from the category of firmly
rooted hearsay exceptions. 182 His second objection was the
Court should allow the state courts to review whether the
confession had particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. 183
Both arguments were consistent with a case-by-case approach
to the development of confrontation doctrine in which the Court
identifies a particular rule for the specific facts without trying
to announce a global rule for other facts.
Three Justices wrote alone. Justice Scalia wrote a one
paragraph concurring opinion that described the issue as
settled under the testimonial interpretation Justice Thomas
had proposed in his concurring opinion in White. 184 His opinion,
while cryptic, made clear that he did not agree with the effort
of Justice Stevens to base confrontation doctrine on Roberts
and that he did not agree with the Chief Justice that the Court
should continue to define confrontation on a case-by-case
basis. 185 Justice Thomas likewise reiterated the testimonial
interpretation he had proposed in White. 186 His own oneparagraph opinion showed that he did not endorse the effort of
Justice Stevens to base confrontation doctrine on Roberts.
Unlike Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas also agreed with the
Chief Justice that the state court should have the first chance
to decide if the confession had particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness. 187 Justice Thomas did not discuss whether a
judge should admit or exclude the statement if it was both
formalized testimonial material and contained particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness.

181
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Id. at 144 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
Lilly, 527 U.S. at 145-46.
Id. at 148.
Id. at 143 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 143 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 143-44.
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Justice Breyer gave advance billing to Crawford in his
concurring opinion by describing the debate as whether the
Sixth Amendment protects trustworthiness or confrontation. 188
He did not take a position on that issue because it was not
necessary to the unanimous conclusion that there was a
confrontation violation. Instead, he simply signaled that at
least some Justices might be willing to consider other ways to
interpret the Confrontation Clause.
II.

CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON

The Petition for Certiorari in Crawford framed one
question about the application of the Court’s confrontation
doctrine to its specific facts and then offered the Court a chance
to return to the broad question it had left unresolved in Lilly.
The two questions were:
I. Whether the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment
permits the admission against a criminal defendant of a custodial
statement by a potential accomplice on the ground that parts of the
statement “interlock” with the defendant’s custodial statement.
II. Whether this Court should reevaluate Confrontation Clause
framework established in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), and
hold that the Clause unequivocally prohibits the admission of out-ofcourt statements insofar as they are contained in “testimonial”
materials, such as tape-recorded custodial statement. 189

The Court granted certiorari on both questions. 190 While
both Justice Scalia’s opinion and the examination of Crawford
have focused primarily on the second question, there are
lessons that can be learned from the Court’s specific answer to
the first one as well. This Part will review the analysis of both
questions in Crawford, take notice of the lack of debate about
Roberts in Crawford, and consider whether Crawford
accurately summarized the confrontation doctrine the Court
had already established.
A.

The Testimonial Interpretation

The defendant in Crawford was convicted of assault by
a jury that heard the custodial statements of both the

188
189
190

Lilly, 527 U.S. at 140, 142 (Breyer, J., concurring).
71 U.S.L.W. 3753 (U.S. June 10, 2003) (No. 02-9410).
Crawford v. Washington, 539 U.S. 914 (2003).

2005] A STABLE FOUNDATION FOR CONFRONTATION DOCTRINE? 65

defendant and his wife. 191 The defendant did not deny stabbing
the victim, but he did claim self-defense. That defense had
some support from the account in the defendant’s custodial
statement that “I could a swore I seen [the victim] goin’ for
somethin’ before . . . .” 192 His self-defense claim was undercut
by his wife’s custodial statement in which she responded to a
question about whether the victim had anything in his hands
before the stabbing by saying: “A. (pausing) um um (no).” 193
The defendant’s wife did not testify because of the state marital
privilege, so the State offered the tape recording of her
statement. 194 The State argued it was a statement against her
penal interest because she admitted she had led the defendant
to the victim’s apartment and facilitated the assault. 195 The
trial judge admitted the statement after finding it had
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness under the test in
Roberts. 196
The Washington Court of Appeals reversed the
conviction. 197 It concluded that his wife’s entire statement was
inadmissible because parts were self-exculpatory 198 and the
parts that were against her penal interest were not sufficiently
reliable to satisfy either the state hearsay rule or the right of
confrontation. 199 The Court of Appeals relied on Lilly 200 and the
United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the federal
penal interest exception in Williamson v. United States. 201 It
distinguished Lee 202 because the statements of the defendant
and his wife were dissimilar on whether the victim had
something in his hand when he was stabbed.
The Washington Supreme Court reversed the Court of
Appeals and reinstated Crawford’s conviction. 203 It concluded
that the statements of the defendant and his wife were
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Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 40-41 (2004).
Id. at 38.
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State v. Crawford, No. 25307-1-II, 2001 WL 850119, at *7 (Wash. Ct. App.
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It turned the
interlocking and virtually identical. 204
discrepancies between their stories about whether and when
the victim had a weapon into a point of similarity by describing
both statements as “ambiguous as to whether [the victim] ever
actually possessed a weapon.” 205 The Washington Supreme
Court based its analysis on its 1993 decision in State v. Rice, 206
in which it had followed the United States Supreme Court’s
decision in Lee v. Illinois. 207 It did not discuss whether Lee was
still a good precedent on the validity of the interlocking
confession theory and it never mentioned Lilly v. Virginia. 208
The facts of Crawford did not require reevaluating
confrontation doctrine to identify the errors of the Washington
Supreme Court. On the facts relevant to self defense, the two
statements did not interlock as much as the confessions in Lee.
The Supreme Court had effectively supplanted Lee in Idaho v.
Wright 209 when it rejected factual corroboration as a means to
establish reliability. 210 The interlocking confession theory was
not mentioned by any Justice in Lilly and had all but
disappeared from other appellate decisions in recent years. In
fact, it had been the grounds in only one unpublished appellate
opinion and had been mentioned in only three other appellate
opinions. 211 The language from Lee cited by the Washington
Supreme Court was not part of the holding because the
conviction in Lee had been reversed. Lee had been cited in the
concurring opinion in Earnest, 212 but no Supreme Court opinion
had ever affirmed a conviction on the basis of the interlocking
confession theory. Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded his
concurring opinion in Crawford by stating that it would have
been sufficient to cite Wright as grounds for reversal. 213 The
result in Crawford makes clear that no Justice thought that
any application of Lee would support admitting the hearsay in
Crawford; the reversal was unanimous.
204

Id. at 664.
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206
Id. at 661 (citing State v. Rice, 844 P.2d 416 (Wash. 1993)).
207
Rice, 844 P.2d at 427 (citing Lee, 476 U.S. 530).
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527 U.S. 116 (1999).
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497 U.S. 805 (1990).
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See supra text accompanying notes 140-48.
211
See Roger W. Kirst, Appellate Court Answers to the Confrontation
Questions in Lilly v. Virginia, 53 SYRACUSE L. REV. 87, 136-37 (2003).
212
See New Mexico v. Earnest, 477 U.S. 648, 649 n.* (1986) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring).
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Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 76 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
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The narrowest interpretation of Crawford on its specific
facts made no change at all in the Court’s doctrine. The Court
reversed the decision of the Washington Supreme Court after
holding that the statement of the defendant’s wife could not be
used unless she testified and was subject to cross-examination
at trial. Justice Scalia’s suggestion that her statement could
have been used if she had testified at trial 214 went beyond the
facts but it was consistent with cases such as Green. 215 He also
suggested that her testimony could have been used if she had
testified at a preliminary hearing at which the defendant had
cross-examined her. 216 That suggestion also went beyond the
facts, but it was consistent with the Court’s decisions in
Green 217 and Roberts. 218 Justice Scalia stated that there were no
facts that would suffice to establish that the particular
statement had indicia of reliability, 219 but that statement did
not undercut any Supreme Court decision.
Justice Scalia did not discuss how and why the
Washington Supreme Court reached its interpretation that a
confrontation objection required a judicial evaluation of the
reliability of the statement. He did not discuss whether
Roberts had instructed judges to screen each statement to
determine its reliability. He did not discuss whether other
courts were misreading Roberts, reading Roberts correctly but
extending it incorrectly beyond its facts, or reading and
extending Roberts correctly in ways that eventually showed
where Roberts was flawed as a foundation. Those questions
might not have been important because the state court decision
was wrong in any event. Those questions, however, can be very
important in deciding how to define an accurate interpretation
of the Confrontation Clause that other courts can and will
apply correctly.
Justice Scalia did explain why the Washington trial
court had erred by allowing the prosecution to use a hearsay
statement after evaluating it for reliability instead of asking
whether the defendant had a chance to cross-examine the
declarant. From his review of the historical record, Justice
214

Id. at 60 n.9 (majority opinion).
See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970). See also United States v.
Owens, 484 U.S. 554 (1988).
216
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 57.
217
Green, 399 U.S. 149.
218
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
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Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68-69.
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Scalia identified two propositions. First, he described the
Confrontation Clause as intended to prevent the prosecution
from routinely using confessions and statements to
investigating magistrates by declarants who did not testify at
trial. 220 Second, he concluded that such statements could be
used only if the declarant was unavailable and the defendant
had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. 221
Justice Scalia described the prior opportunity for crossexamination as a necessary condition for introducing the
statement, not just a sufficient condition. 222 Establishing that
the prior opportunity to cross-examine was a necessary
condition meant that there could not be any alternatives or
substitutes. It meant that the reliability of the statement could
not be the equivalent of cross-examination and that judicial
evaluation of the reliability of a statement could not be a
substitute for the right of confrontation. That conclusion was
also implicitly supported by Justice Scalia’s historical review
because none of the evidence he presented suggested that
reliability was the proper test. Chief Justice Rehnquist did not
contest that issue in his concurrence. He did not agree that the
distinction between testimonial and nontestimonial hearsay
had been as important as it was described by Justice Scalia,
but the Chief Justice did not argue that reliability had been
considered an alternative test to cross-examination. 223
Justice Scalia’s discussion of the scope of his
interpretation of the Confrontation Clause was framed in the
same terms as the dilemma described by Justice Harlan in
Green and by Justice Blackmun in Roberts. 224 Justice Scalia
suggested the Clause could provide a right to confront only
those who testify at trial, a right to confront every person
whose statement is offered at trial, or a right somewhere in
between. 225 He rejected both polar interpretations, as had
Justice Harlan and Justice Blackmun, and then adopted an inbetween interpretation the Court had not previously endorsed.
Justice Scalia rejected the narrowest coverage of the
Clause because it was contrary to an inference he drew from its
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Id. at 50-53.
Id. at 53-54.
Id. at 55.
See id. at 69-76 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
See supra text accompanying notes 34-35, 63-64.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42-43.
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history. 226 He described the history of confrontation as a
political and legal concept that was at least as old as Roman
times. He described the history of the Confrontation Clause as
showing that it was directed at the use of ex parte
examinations as evidence for the prosecution. 227 Therefore, the
Clause must do more than guarantee a right to cross-examine
those who testify at trial because it was not intended to leave
the admissibility of all out-of-court statements to the law of
evidence.
Justice Scalia also rejected the broadest coverage of the
Clause that would make it applicable to all out-of-court
statements by declaring that some hearsay was outside the
core concerns of the Sixth Amendment. 228 He described those
statements most clearly covered by the Confrontation Clause
as “testimonial.” Justice Scalia acknowledged that he had not
provided a comprehensive definition of that label, but he said
that at a minimum a statement was testimonial if it was made
in police interrogation or in testimony at a preliminary
hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial. 229
Justice Scalia reviewed the Court’s confrontation
decisions to demonstrate that their results were consistent
with his testimonial interpretation of the Confrontation
Clause. 230 The Court had allowed the prosecution to use prior
testimony of an unavailable witness who had been crossexamined. It had not allowed the prosecution to use prior
testimony of a witness who was not unavailable or the prior
testimony of a witness the defendant had no opportunity to
cross-examine. He emphasized that the Court had excluded
prosecution use of accomplice confessions that were testimonial
in Lilly and Lee, and reconciled the approval of the admission
of the accomplice statement in Dutton by describing it as not
testimonial. 231 He asserted that other than one minor and
arguable exception in White, the Court had never accepted
anything other than a prior opportunity for cross-examination
as sufficient to allow the prosecution to use a testimonial
Justice Scalia did not examine how his
statement. 232
226
227
228
229
230
231
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Id. at 50-51.
Id. at 50.
Id. at 51.
Id. at 68.
Id. at 57-59.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 57.
Id. at 58 n.8 & 59 (citing White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992)).
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suggestion that confrontation analysis had been going in the
wrong direction for twenty-four years since Roberts could be
consistent with his conclusion that the Court had been
reaching correct results during those same years.
At first, the statement in Crawford that confrontation
alone will allow the prosecution to use a testimonial statement
may appear to be a bright-line rule because the rule as stated
allows no exceptions or balancing. In another sense, however,
the statement in Crawford is only another balancing test, with
the balancing now being carried out in deciding whether any
statement should be labeled testimonial. The emphasis on the
historical record in Crawford may suggest that it is a balancing
test controlled by history and therefore a balance that does not
consider present-day factors. Whether and how the Court
applies Crawford in future cases may depend on how well this
balancing test accords with the historical record and whether it
provides a workable foundation for confrontation doctrine
B.

The Missing Debate in Crawford

The opinions in Crawford involve only the appearance of
a debate about Roberts. Justice Scalia identified the Roberts
test as reducing the right of confrontation to a question of
reliability. He targeted the “unpardonable vice of the Roberts
test,” 233 “Roberts’ failings,” 234 and “Roberts’ unpredictable and
He said “the Roberts test is
inconsistent application.” 235
inherently, and therefore permanently, unpredictable.” 236 The
Chief Justice began his opinion in Crawford as a “dissent from
the Court’s decision to overrule Ohio v. Roberts” 237 and conceded
that “the Court of course overrules Ohio v. Roberts.” 238
Despite the references to Roberts, Crawford was not a
debate about the holding in Roberts or the Court’s application
of the Roberts test. Justice Scalia specifically included Roberts
when he described the holdings of the Supreme Court cases
that were “largely consistent” with the two propositions he
derived from the historical record. 239 Justice Scalia did not
233
234
235
236
237
238
239

Id. at 63.
Id. at 65.
Id. at 66.
Id. at 68 n.10 (emphasis omitted).
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 69 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
Id. at 75.
Id. at 57-58 (majority opinion).
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identify any case in which the Supreme Court had reached the
wrong result by applying the Roberts test. Even his footnote
questioning the implications of White v. Illinois for issues the
Court had not specifically addressed in that case did not assign
any blame to reliance on the Roberts test. 240 The Chief Justice
argued that the Court should not change course, but he did not
defend the Roberts test nor describe the Roberts test as the
course the Supreme Court should continue to follow.
In Crawford, the Justices were debating whether and
how the Court should describe an overall theory of
confrontation. On the issue of whether the Court should do
that, Justice Scalia was following the lead of Justice Blackmun
in Roberts. Roberts was the first and only other time the Court
had proposed an overall theory of confrontation. On the issue
of how to do that, Justice Scalia described a theory that was
quite different from the one Justice Blackmun proposed in
Roberts.
Nevertheless, Justice Scalia followed the lead of
Justice Blackmun and Justice Harlan before him by assuming
that an overall theory of confrontation should identify the
kinds of hearsay excluded by the right of confrontation. In
contrast, on the issue of whether to describe an overall theory,
the Chief Justice rejected the approach of Justice Scalia as well
as that of Justice Blackmun; he argued that the Court should
not describe an overall theory of confrontation of any kind. The
course the Chief Justice wanted the Court to continue following
was a case-by-case development of confrontation doctrine by
addressing the facts of each case.
C.

Pre-Crawford Confrontation Doctrine after Crawford

Justice Scalia illustrated some implications of the
testimonial interpretation with brief descriptions of the
confrontation rules addressed in the Court’s pre-Crawford
cases. His endorsement of the results in those cases means
that the rules they established should still be viable after
Crawford. His summaries of those rules, however, require
careful attention to nuances in the prior cases.
1. Dying Declaration
Justice Scalia did not contest that a dying declaration
could be used without confrontation, in part because the
240

Id. at 58 n.8.
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Supreme Court had recognized the dying declaration in
Mattox. 241 He went on to concede that even a testimonial dying
declaration might be admissible without confrontation. 242 For
that conclusion he cited English common law decisions and an
English treatise. 243 He suggested that this would be the only
exception for a testimonial statement because it is sui generis
in the English common law. 244 Justice Scalia’s assumption that
the scope of any exception should be defined by English
common law may explain why he did not include a caution that
the discussion of the dying declaration exception in Mattox was
dictum. It may also explain why he did not mention that the
Court could still consider further limitations or qualifications
for dying declarations, as he did when he suggested that
spontaneous declarations might have to be made immediately.
Crawford may suggest that any statement is admissible if it
can be labeled a dying declaration, but there is still no case in
which the Supreme Court has affirmed a conviction on that
basis.
2. Forfeiture
Justice Scalia also endorsed a second exception to the
bright-line rule for testimonial statements when he stated that
“the rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing (which we accept)
extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable
grounds.” 245 For this proposition, Justice Scalia used a “See”
signal and cited Reynolds v. United States. 246 There are many
questions about the forfeiture doctrine that were not discussed
in this brief mention in Crawford. Justice Scalia did not
discuss whether the original meaning of the Sixth Amendment
had been followed in Reynolds in 1879. He did not suggest any
limits on the rule of forfeiture that might be derived from
Reynolds, even though elsewhere in Crawford he emphasized
the need to read the facts of Supreme Court precedent
precisely.
Reynolds did not involve an ordinary hearsay
statement. The hearsay was prior testimony at an earlier trial
241
242
243
244
245
246

Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243-44 (1895).
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.6.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 62.
Id. (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158-59 (1879)).
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of the same defendant under a different indictment. 247 The
defendant had been present and had a full opportunity to crossexamine. 248 There was evidence that the defendant was
actively involved in preventing the witness from testifying.
That involvement was continuous and ongoing at the time the
prior testimony was offered. 249 The Court found that the
prosecution had made an adequate showing that the witness
was not available. 250 The Supreme Court cited two English
cases that had allowed the prosecution to use prior testimony –
an examination and a deposition – in both of which the
defendant had kept the witness away. 251 The Supreme Court
cited two state cases as holding the same without discussing
their facts. 252 It then cited three American treatises as support
for its statement that “if a witness is kept away by the adverse
party, his testimony, taken on a former trial between the same
parties upon the same issues, may be given in evidence.” 253
Reynolds did not consider whether the forfeiture rule
would apply if the defendant had killed the witness as part of
the original crime without specifically intending to make the
witness an unavailable hearsay declarant. That is a different
kind of wrongdoing because its effect cannot be undone at the
time of trial, while in Reynolds the defendant could have
changed his mind and permitted the witness to attend and
testify. Reynolds did not consider whether the defendant’s
wrongdoing would have mattered if the hearsay had been
something other than prior testimony at a trial in which the
defendant had already had one chance to confront the
declarant.
In criticizing the reliability test, Justice Scalia wrote
that “[d]ispensing with confrontation because testimony is
obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial because
a defendant is obviously guilty.” 254 That criticism could apply
as well to some versions of a forfeiture rule. Should forfeiture
depend on no more than a judicial finding that a defendant’s
alleged commission of the crime contributed to the
247
248
249
250
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Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 158-59.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62.
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unavailability of live testimony? That possibility would raise
the question of whether dispensing with confrontation because
the judge thinks the defendant is obviously guilty is akin to
dispensing with the jury verdict because the defendant is
obviously guilty. That question was not answered in Reynolds
or Crawford.
How much the forfeiture exception is limited to the facts
of Reynolds may determine how broad the exception becomes,
but any exception undercuts the possibility that the historical
interpretation of Crawford will clarify confrontation doctrine
with a bright-line rule. At the same time, the endorsement of
the forfeiture exception without examining how it fits into the
historical record raises a question about whether the
testimonial interpretation will provide a stable and coherent
foundation for confrontation doctrine.
3. Prior Testimony
Justice Scalia gave substantial attention to the
He
Supreme Court’s precedent on prior testimony. 255
summarized the cases that required the government to show
that the witness was not available to testify at trial, the cases
that had excluded confessions where the defendant had no
opportunity to cross-examine, and the cases that allowed prior
testimony only if the defendant had an adequate opportunity to
cross-examine. 256 Justice Scalia described Roberts as a case in
which the defendant had examined the witness and
emphasized in his discussion of Lee that it was important to
recognize precisely what the Court actually held. 257 In his
conclusion, however, he summarized the Court’s prior holdings
too broadly.
In the text, Justice Scalia stated that “[t]estimonial
statements of witnesses absent from trial have been admitted
only where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the
defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine.” 258 By
listing the prior opportunity to cross-examine as sufficient,
Justice Scalia went beyond the holdings of the Court’s two
primary cases: Green and Roberts. In Green, Justice White
had described the witness at the preliminary hearing as
255
256
257
258
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“subjected to extensive cross-examination by respondent’s
In Roberts, Justice Blackmun described how
counsel.” 259
“[d]efense counsel questioned [the witness] at some length” at
the preliminary hearing as “counsel continued to explore the
underlying events in detail.” 260
Justice Blackmun stated that the state court opinion in
Roberts had raised the issue of whether Green had suggested
that “the mere opportunity to cross-examine rendered the prior
testimony admissible.” 261 He explicitly said the Court “need not
decide” whether that was correct. 262 He further said that the
Court need not “decide whether de minimis questioning is
sufficient.” 263 No matter how much the general theory in
Roberts might be rejected, Justice Blackmun limited the scope
of its specific holding by reserving this issue. Crawford does
not establish that the Court has accepted that a prior
opportunity to cross-examine is sufficient.
In addition,
expanding the rule to allow the prosecution to use former
testimony on no more than a prior opportunity to crossexamine or de minimis questioning raises an issue that was not
subject to historical analysis in Crawford.
4. Trial Confrontation
Similarly, Justice Scalia’s statement that a testimonial
statement can be used if “the declarant appears for crossexamination at trial” suggests that the appearance will
suffice. 264 This statement was supported by a citation to page
162 in Part II of Green, 265 with no mention that in Part IV of
Green the Supreme Court remanded the case for further
factfinding because a mere appearance by the declarant was
In Green, Justice White stated that the
not enough. 266
application of the rule in a typical case would be proper
because the witness at trial would give a different version of
the facts from the prior statement and be subject to crossexamination with respect to both versions. 267 In Green, the
259
260
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declarant’s presence with an apparent lapse of memory might
have affected the right to cross-examine in a way that would
create a confrontation problem, so the Court framed the
question on remand as whether there was sufficient crossexamination at trial. 268
In Crawford, Justice Scalia may have come closer to
describing the limits imposed by part IV of Green when he said
that a statement could be used “so long as the declarant is
present at trial to defend or explain it.” 269 However, that
language still focuses on presence and ability to act without
requiring that the record show the declarant actually did
defend or explain the statement. The requirement of an actual
examination is a detail that can be easily overlooked by an
attorney or judge who assumes that the latest Supreme Court
mention of a topic provides a complete statement of every rule.
Since this is also a detail that has not been examined under the
testimonial theory of Crawford, it remains another reason to be
hesitant about whether Crawford has provided a complete
foundation for confrontation doctrine.
5. Business Records
Justice Scalia declared that statements within other
common law hearsay exceptions, such as business records,
were not testimonial. 270 The Chief Justice approved of that
exception and expanded it to include business records and
official records. 271 Neither opinion mentioned that the Court
has never directly addressed the confrontation issues raised by
the hearsay exception for business records or official records.
Even if the common ground in the two opinions creates the
appearance that the Court will probably not require
confrontation for every business record or official record, that
does not necessarily mean that every application of those labels
will be sufficient to overcome a confrontation objection. The
Court has not yet examined whether the historical record
supports the classification of every business record as a
nontestimonial statement.
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III.

LEARNING MORE FROM THE HISTORICAL RECORD

Justice Scalia used the historical record in Crawford to
address two related but different questions about confrontation
doctrine.
The first question asked whether admitting a
statement on the basis of a judicial evaluation that it was
reliable was consistent with the best interpretation of the
original meaning of the Sixth Amendment. On that question,
Crawford made clear that a judicial finding of reliability was
not sufficient to overcome the textual requirement that a
defendant have the right to confront the witnesses. 272 Unless
that reading of history can be challenged in some way with new
evidence, Crawford appears to have made a permanent
alteration to the direction in which confrontation doctrine had
been moving.
The second question asked whether the historical record
could be used to create a workable test that would exclude all
improper hearsay statements but permit the prosecution to use
evidence that does not violate the right of confrontation. The
proposal in Crawford that the distinction should be whether
the statement is testimonial is an interpretation of the
historical record that can be examined on several points. This
Part will consider whether there might be alternative
conclusions about the original meaning of the Confrontation
Clause. It will describe what the ratification history shows
about the original meaning, discuss the dangers of reading the
historical record from a modern perspective, and examine the
roots of Crawford in the history of the Supreme Court’s search
for confrontation doctrine.
A.

The Ratification Debates as a Source for the Original
Meaning

Justice Scalia did not survey the history of confrontation
in an unbroken sweep from Roman times to today. Instead, his
history consists of specific points organized chronologically
without being necessarily connected. That may be the only
way to present so much history within a single Court opinion,
but it leaves open the possibility that the Framers’ generation
did not know all the historical evidence that can now be
assembled and may have interpreted it differently from the
272
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way it is interpreted today.
Presenting the history
chronologically can also suggest a causation relation that may
not necessarily be accurate.
Some of these questions are raised by Justice Scalia’s
discussion of the confrontation history in the 16th and 17th
centuries in England and in the Colonies. 273 For England, he
discussed the well-known prosecution of Lord Raleigh on the
basis of a confession by a witness who was examined before
Privy Council. 274 He gave more emphasis to the caselaw
concerning examinations of suspects and witnesses by justices
of the peace under statutes of Queen Mary’s reign. 275 When he
turned to the Colonies his examples were different. The
controversial examination practices he described were the use
of gubernatorial commissions to examine witnesses in Virginia
and the enforcement of the Stamp Act in the admiralty courts
in Massachusetts. 276 Justice Scalia then listed the Colonial
declarations of rights adopted around the time of the
Revolution without discussing whether they were a response to
the Marian statutes he had emphasized or a response to the
Colonial experience. There may have been a major difference.
One study of the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination clause
describes the colonial use of the Marian statutes by
magistrates to control the lower classes as unobjectionable to
the upper classes who protested the expanded jurisdiction of
the admiralty courts to punish smuggling. 277
Justice Scalia used even fewer sources for the original
meaning of the Sixth Amendment when he reached the time of
the Constitution.
He cited only two sources from the
ratification history.
Each quotation confirmed that the
founding-era rhetoric decried the omission of a right of
confrontation from the proposed Constitution, but it is hard to
find any details about that right in either quotation. It is also
hard to know how much significance to attribute to silence
about nontestimonial hearsay without knowing whether the
speaker was a lawyer who might have known about the details
of evidence law in a criminal case.
273

Id. at 43-48.
Id. at 44.
275
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43-47.
276
Id. at 47-48.
277
Eben Moglen, Taking the Fifth: Reconsidering the Origins of the
Constitutional Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1086, 1107-11,
1115-17, 1121 (1994).
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The first person Justice Scalia quoted was Abraham
Holmes of Massachusetts, a delegate to the Massachusetts
ratifying convention:
The mode of trial is altogether indetermined; . . . whether [the
defendant] is to be allowed to confront the witnesses, and have the
advantage of cross-examination, we are not yet told . . . . [W]e shall
find Congress possessed of powers enabling them to institute
judicatories little less auspicious than a certain tribunal in
Spain, . . . the Inquisition. 278

Secondary sources have described Abraham Holmes as
someone who was self-educated in the law and the president of
a local court of sessions, 279 but that description does not fit Mr.
Holmes in 1788. His unpublished autobiography makes clear
that his minor judicial career began several years later and
that he gave up his judicial career when he was finally
admitted to practice law. 280 By 1788, he had done no more than
begin to read a few law books; none of them concerned criminal
law, criminal procedure, or evidence. His autobiography does
not mention any experience in a criminal trial before he spoke
about confrontation in 1788.
The second person Justice Scalia quoted was an
anonymous Antifederalist who used the name Federal Farmer
in a published essay:
Nothing can be more essential than the cross examining [of]
witnesses, and generally before the triers of the facts in
question . . . . [W]ritten evidence . . . [is] almost useless; it must be
frequently taken ex parte, and but very seldom leads to the proper
discovery of truth. 281

Justice Scalia identified Federal Farmer as R. Lee. 282
That attribution is in accord with one possibility that Federal

278
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 48-49 (quoting 2 DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 110-11 (J. Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1863)).
279
See 30 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 47, § 6347, at 709; THE DEBATE ON
THE CONSTITUTION:
FEDERALIST AND ANTIFEDERALIST SPEECHES, ARTICLES, AND
LETTERS DURING THE STRUGGLE OVER RATIFICATION, pt. 1, at 1011-12 (Bernard Bailyn
ed., 1993).
280
Abraham Holmes, Memoirs of Abraham Holmes, Esq., 1754-1839 (no date)
(unpublished manuscript on deposit at the Rochester Historical Society, Rochester,
Massachusetts).
281
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 49 (quoting R. Lee, Letter IV by the Federal Farmer
(Oct. 15, 1787), reprinted in 1 B. SWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY 469, 473 (1971)).
282
Id. at 49.
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Farmer was Richard Henry Lee, 283 a Virginia politician who
was not a lawyer and had, at most, one year of judicial
experience as a justice of the peace over thirty years earlier. 284
Other scholars have identified Federal Farmer as the merchant
Melancton Smith of New York, again not a lawyer or judge. 285
There are other sources in the ratification debates
Justice Scalia might have quoted, but those sources likewise
cannot be confirmed to have been lawyers or judges. For
example, Brutus was another anonymous Antifederalist writer
who also wrote about confrontation. 286 Brutus has often been
identified as Robert Yates, a New York judge at the time, but
the literature suggests other potential identities who were not
The doubts that any statements about
lawyers. 287
confrontation in the ratification debates were made by a judge
or lawyer has to raise a question about whether any quotation
is a reliable commentary on the rules of evidence.
On the critical question of evidence about the meaning
of the Sixth Amendment itself, Justice Scalia included only a
single sentence that “[t]he First Congress responded by
including the Confrontation Clause in the proposal that became
the Sixth Amendment.” 288 Justice Scalia did not mention
James Madison, considered the actual author of the Sixth
Amendment, but it does not appear that Madison left any
useful clues about the meaning of the Confrontation Clause.
The First Congress changed the wording in the proposed
Amendment from “accusers and witnesses” to just “witnesses”
without leaving any useful legislative history, 289 so there is no
way to know whether that change is significant to the search
for the original meaning. That does not mean that there are no
other clues to what might have been the original meaning of
the words used in the Confrontation Clause. One clue requires
considering the context in which the objections about
confrontation were raised.
283

See 30 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 47, § 6347, at 682 n.237.
See Biographical Directory of the United States Congress: 1774-1989, at
1357-58 (Bicentennial ed., 1989).
285
See Robert H. Webking, Melancton Smith and the ‘Letters from the Federal
Farmer’, 44 WM. & MARY Q. 510 (1987).
286
See 30 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 47, § 6347, at 686 & 733-34.
287
See Robert M. Pitler, Independent State Search and Seizure
Constitutionalism: The New York State Court of Appeals’ Quest for Principled
Decisionmaking, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 38 n.119 (1996).
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Crawford, 541 U.S. at 49.
289
See EDWARD DUMBAULD, THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY
206-22 (1957).
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The inquiry about the context of the objections can
begin with Abraham Holmes, the speaker Justice Scalia quoted
from the ratification debates. Mr. Holmes was one of 364
delegates to the Massachusetts ratification convention. 290
Many representatives listed on the delegate roster have titles
of Honorable, Reverend, Esquire, or a military rank, but
Abraham Holmes was one of many whose only title was
Mister. 291 The few lines from his speech quoted by Justice
Scalia are only a small fraction of Mr. Holmes’s entire speech.
Mr. Holmes did not limit his speech to the two objections to the
Constitution quoted in Crawford: that the Constitution did not
establish a right to confront witnesses and that it did not
guarantee a defendant the advantage of cross-examination. In
his speech, Mr. Holmes also objected to at least fifteen other
omissions from the Constitution. 292 The topics ranged from
some covered later by the Bill of Rights, such as the lack of
protection against compelled self-incrimination, 293 to the less
serious, such as not providing for the frequency of court
sessions. 294 There were other complaints about rights that are
still not recognized, such as compensating acquitted defendants
for their loss of liberty and loss of time. 295
The same description provides the context for Federal
Farmer, the second quotation in Crawford from the ratification
debates. Federal Farmer’s list of objections was almost as long
as that of Mr. Holmes, with at least nine of them addressing
the evils that would arise from the Constitution plus six more
arguing for other rights that should be protected by a bill of
rights. 296
Justice Scalia made a traditional argument by using the
ratification history as a surrogate for legislative history. He
did not, however, appear to recognize that this approach may
warp the ratification history so far out of context that it
becomes misleading. This approach has the effect of re-casting
290
DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONVENTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH
MASSACHUSETTS HELD IN THE YEAR 1788, at 31-43 (Bradford Pierce & Charles Hale
eds., 1856).
291
Id. at 31-43.
292
2 DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 109-12 (J. Elliot ed., 2d ed.
1863), reprinted in 2 THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 689-91 (Bernard
Schwartz ed., 1971) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY].
293
2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 292, at 691.
294
Id. at 690.
295
Id.
296
1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 292, at 469-75.
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the Antifederalists as the defenders of confrontation; it
implicitly assumes that the Federalists played an opposing role
as the enemies of confrontation. Of course, the Federalists
were the opponents of the Antifederalists, but it was not on the
subject of confrontation. No one has ever presented any
evidence that the opposing sides actually debated the meaning
of confrontation in the way the terms of a modern statute
might be debated or negotiated. The Federalists had no
apparent interest in taking the other side on many objections
raised by the Antifederalists; they certainly showed no interest
in restricting a defendant’s right to confront prosecution
witnesses. The full speech of Abraham Holmes and the full
text of Federal Farmer presented reasons to reject the
Constitution. They were Antifederalist statements and should
be read as only that.
The ratification debates show both that the right of
confrontation was being debated by nonlawyers and that no
one objected that an issue involving the details of a criminal
trial was being debated by nonlawyers. That means there is no
evidence that anyone thought the debate was about the precise
scope of the right of confrontation or the elements of any
hearsay exceptions the courts should recognize. The context of
the ratification debates suggests that the original meaning of
the Confrontation Clause must be sought on a different level.
Instead of the level of technical detail that might have been of
interest to lawyers and meaningful to judges, both Abraham
Holmes and Federal Farmer were speaking about broader
political theory in arguing that the plan of the Constitution
should not be accepted without some protection for the right of
confrontation. Whether or not they were competent to speak
about the working details of confrontation, they made no effort
to do so.
Equally important is that the full content of the speech
of Abraham Holmes and the letter of Federal Farmer show that
they were not trying to catalogue all the details of the right of
confrontation that would not be protected without
constitutional protection. They were also not debating English
common law. They were making political arguments about
broad theory. Their omission of all the permutations cannot be
taken as any evidence that they did not also care about what
they did not mention. They were not responding to a demand
for a bill of particulars on the question of confrontation alone.
Nor were they trying to provide guidance for applying the
Confrontation Clause that had not yet been drafted.
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B.

The Risks of a Modern Perspective

The outpouring of research on confrontation since
Justice Harlan lamented the scarcity of sources in Green has
shown how much English and American criminal procedure
and evidence rules were evolving before 1791 and how much
the American hearsay rule evolved after 1791. In Green,
Justice Harlan framed his question as whether the Sixth
Amendment had constitutionalized the hearsay rule. 297 Justice
Blackmun began his general theory in Roberts by considering
the relationship between the Confrontation Clause and the
hearsay rule. 298 Each Justice assumed that they could find
guidance for a modern question in the historical record even
though the modern question may never have been considered
in the earlier era.
It might appear that Justice Scalia avoided that
problem in Crawford by seeking the meaning of the Sixth
Amendment at the time it was written. He appeared to
insulate the meaning of the Confrontation Clause from being
misconstrued in modern terms by declaring that it “is most
naturally read as a reference to the right of confrontation at
common law, admitting only those exceptions established at
the time of the founding.” 299 While he cited some early state
cases elsewhere in his opinion, he cited English common law as
his source for the common law of 1791. 300 Justice Scalia and
Chief Justice Rehnquist debated about English common law.
English common law may be more accessible or more welldefined than American common law, but Justice Scalia’s survey
of the historical record did not provide any evidence that the
original meaning was tied to English common law. There is no
mention of English common law in the statements from the
ratification debates quoted by Justice Scalia.
Other explicit text in the Bill of Rights raises questions
about Justice Scalia’s statement that the Confrontation Clause
“is most naturally read as a reference to the right of
confrontation at common law.” 301 Justice Scalia immediately
followed that with “[a]s the English authorities above reveal,

297
298
299
300
301

California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 173 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 62 (1980).
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004).
Id. at 45-47, 54.
Id. at 54.
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the common law in 1791 . . . .” 302 Interpreting the text of an
Amendment as adopting the common law is well-known in
Seventh Amendment doctrine.
Of course, the Seventh
Amendment declaration that “the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved” 303 is not matched by any text in the Sixth
Amendment.
The Sixth Amendment’s contrast with the
Seventh Amendment is evidence that the Framers did not use
language clearly intended to preserve the right of confrontation
as it then existed in English common law.
Those doubts about whether Justice Scalia actually
found the original meaning in Crawford do not necessarily
undercut the specific holding of the case or even the Court’s
rejection of the reliability test. There is equally no mention of a
judicial reliability test anywhere in the ratification history.
The doubts raised by the ratification history, however, are
much more significant to the suggestion in Crawford that the
original meaning of confrontation was limited to testimonial
statements.
It is misleading to rely on hindsight to view evolution as
a foreordained process. That caution applies to the evolution of
the hearsay rule before and after 1791. From the modern
perspective, we can observe the evolution of evidence law from
its unformed structure in 1791 to the Federal Rules of
Evidence. However, it was also possible in 1791 that the
evolution would go in the opposite direction and the hearsay
rule would wither and die. There might be no hearsay rule at
all today, but there would still be a Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause. In the same way, other steps and actors
in the criminal justice system might have evolved in a different
direction. For example, the preliminary examination might
have disappeared if all jurisdictions decided to use indictment
by a grand jury; that would mean there might be prior
testimony only for an occasional retrial. The modern police
force might not have evolved as a public agency.
An
interpretation of the Confrontation Clause should remain
consistent and coherent even if there is no hearsay rule, no
preliminary examination, and no public prosecutor or public
police department.
Justice Scalia invoked the text of the Confrontation
Clause to support his conclusion that its primary or even
302
303

Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
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exclusive focus was the specific type of out-of-court statement
he labeled testimonial hearsay. 304 He cited Noah Webster’s
1828 dictionary, 305 not exactly a contemporary source for the
meaning of language used four decades earlier.
The
implication of his argument is that the word “witnesses” was
chosen for a purpose, but he did not suggest what word might
have been used in its place. All the models available in colonial
charters used either “witnesses” alone or used both “witnesses”
and “accusers,” 306 but Justice Scalia did not draw any
conclusions from the omission of “accusers” from the Sixth
Amendment text.
Justice Scalia’s use of textual interpretation to buttress
his testimonial interpretation did not mention the Supreme
Court cases that have established that the text of the
Confrontation Clause is applicable to more than questions
about hearsay. Some were cases in which he participated. For
example, Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Coy v. Iowa
established that the Confrontation Clause can be violated by a
screen in the courtroom that prevents face-to-face confrontation
Justice Scalia
between the defendant and witnesses. 307
308
from Justice O’Connor’s
dissented in Maryland v. Craig
conclusion in the majority opinion that a particular closedcircuit television system did not violate the right of
confrontation, 309 but both Justices agreed that the Clause could
be violated by the manner in which nonhearsay evidence was
presented. In Olden v. Kentucky, 310 a Per Curiam opinion
reversed a state conviction because the trial court’s restrictions
on the defendant’s cross-examination of a witness did not give
proper weight to the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. 311
Other cases before Justice Scalia joined the Court had
established that the Clause governs the right to cross-examine

304

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53.
Id. (citing NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
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a witness 312 and the right of a defendant to be present in the
courtroom to see the witnesses. 313
The right to cross-examine witnesses who testify at trial
and the right to see and be seen by those witnesses are rights
based on the text of the Confrontation Clause. They illustrate
that its effect is broader than restrictions on hearsay. As
Justice Scalia observed in his Craig dissent, these explicit
rights support an implicit limitation upon hearsay evidence,
“since otherwise the government could subvert the
confrontation right by putting on witnesses who know nothing
except what an absent declarant said.” 314 When Justice Scalia
suggested that the specific words of the Confrontation Clause
were chosen for the purpose of making a distinction between
testimonial and nontestimonial hearsay that is not apparent in
the text, he did not mention the Clause’s nonhearsay effect or
his own explanation for its effect on hearsay. An explanation
for this silence may be found in the Supreme Court’s
confrontation doctrine history.
C.

The Roots of Crawford’s Testimonial Theory in Prior
Supreme Court Doctrine

Justice Scalia’s opinion in Crawford can be read as an
attempt to resolve the dilemma that Justice Harlan defined in
Green and then could not overcome in Dutton, and that Justice
Justice Scalia’s
Blackmun tried to resolve in Roberts. 315
approach in Crawford rested on an implicit assumption that
Justice Harlan and Justice Blackmun had focused on the
wrong word by thinking about “confrontation.” He proposed
that clarity requires focusing on the word “witnesses.” 316 The
switch in emphasis had been advocated in academic writings
before Crawford. 317 It produces a newly titled “testimonial”
theory about the Confrontation Clause.
The “testimonial” theory may appear to provide the
overall structure for confrontation doctrine that eluded Justice
312
See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678-79 (1986); Davis v. Alaska,
415 U.S. 308, 315 (1974).
313
See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 342-43 (1970).
314
497 U.S. at 865 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
315
See supra text accompanying notes 34-35, 63-64.
316
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004).
317
AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 125-31
(1997); Richard Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles, 86 GEO. L.J.
1011 (1998).
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Harlan and Justice Blackmun. Dividing all statements into
testimonial and nontestimonial hearsay might seem to provide
a simplified structure for confrontation doctrine that can be
more readily applied at trial. The single rule that a prior
opportunity to cross-examine is the only way to satisfy the
textual requirement of confrontation provides a bright-line test.
The testimonial theory may not be supported by any evidence
from the ratification history, but it is a sufficiently plausible
interpretation of what the Framers might have meant that
there is no directly contrary evidence.
The focus on the word “witnesses” in the Confrontation
Clause also has the effect of distracting attention from how the
testimonial interpretation has to be adapted to make it serve as
a global theory. Even when it was first advocated by Justice
Thomas in his concurring opinion in White, 318 it was not as selfcontained as it might be made to appear. Justice Thomas
suggested the difficulties of trying to define the functional
equivalent of in-court testimony but he proposed a rule that
would apply to “formalized testimonial materials,” such as
testimony. 319 Justice Scalia in Crawford followed his appeal to
the text of the Clause by listing Justice Thomas’s definition of
the functional equivalent as well as two other possible
definitions suggested in the Petitioner’s Brief and an Amicus
Brief. 320 The need for such nontextual refinements undercuts
the appearance that the text of the Clause actually supports
the testimonial interpretation.
The presence of the right of confrontation in the Bill of
Rights is a textual clue that the Framers might have been
concerned with confrontation. The absence of any detail in the
Confrontation Clause is a textual clue that the Framers did not
think it was necessary to define the details of a hearsay rule.
Justice Scalia provided a description of a right of confrontation
that was based on the prevalent assumption that the original
meaning was about hearsay. Justice Scalia’s opinion in
Crawford did not, however, examine how the Court might
interpret the Confrontation Clause if it abandoned that
assumption and read the original meaning as a statement
about confrontation.

318
319
320

White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 358 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 365.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52.
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REASONS AND A FOUNDATION FOR REVISING THE
TESTIMONIAL INTERPRETATION

The questions that remain after Crawford should not
obscure the importance of the changes it made. The decisions
from federal and state courts since Crawford have brought to
light a substantial number of interpretations of the
Confrontation Clause that seem doubtful.
Crawford has
focused attention on several statutory hearsay exceptions that
may have gone well beyond what the Supreme Court had ever
upheld under Roberts or any other precedent.
The questions that remain after Crawford also do not
negate the possibility that even an imperfect or incomplete
theory may be the best theory. It may be unreasonable to
expect to find any theory that is fully consistent with the
historical record, practically useful in the trial courts, and
sufficiently complete to provide guidance about new questions
as they arise. It is always important to ask how serious the
gaps might be and whether there is an alternative that is
demonstrably better. This Part will examine some possible
gaps in the testimonial theory of Crawford and describe the
roots of an alternative interpretation of the Confrontation
Clause.
A.

Gaps in the Testimonial Interpretation

One danger created by Crawford is that the effort to
base confrontation doctrine so heavily on history appears to
provide no clear principles for deciding whether a particular
statement is testimonial or nontestimonial, or for defining the
confrontation requirements for nontestimonial statements.
Without a clear principle, it will be difficult to distinguish
between decisions that apply Crawford properly to facts the
Supreme Court has not yet addressed and those that limit
Crawford as closely as possible to its specific facts in order to
minimize any actual effect on prior practice. For example,
some courts have suggested that “interrogation” should be
found only where it is structured and formal, so that lessstructured fact gathering by police officers is outside the
Child forensic
concern of the Confrontation Clause. 321

321
See, e.g., People v. Kilday, 20 Cal. Rptr. 3d 161, 172-74 (Cal. Ct. App.
2004), review granted, 105 P.3d 114 (Cal. 2005); People v. West, 823 N.E.2d 82, 88-89
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interviewers have been advised to change some of their
techniques to increase the chances their interviews will be
labeled nontestimonial and admitted when the child does not
testify. 322 The Supreme Court can control when it might decide
whether Crawford requires something more than delaying the
start of police questioning or making small changes to an
interview protocol, but other courts must decide those issues
now as the criminal justice system responds to Crawford.
This reaction to Crawford is neither unusual nor
improper. It appears, however, to be happening more quickly
today than when Roberts was decided twenty-five years ago.
The rapid exchange of information about a Supreme Court
decision produces a quicker and broader spread of knowledge
about an opinion than before, but it also permits a broader
exchange of possible countermeasures and responses.
The importance of considering how the bench and bar
might respond to an opinion is highlighted by the absence of
any discussion in Crawford about why confrontation doctrine
might have gone in the wrong direction after Roberts. Roberts
required that a statement have indicia of reliability. 323 It did
not, however, state that particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness would permit the prosecution to use a hearsay
statement; rather it said that a statement must be excluded
unless the statement had particularized guarantees of
The Supreme Court twice rejected
trustworthiness. 324
arguments that the right of confrontation could be satisfied by
showing that the particular statement was reliable, first in
Lee 325 and then in Wright. 326 Nevertheless, Justice Scalia did
not have to search far to find examples of other courts citing
Roberts for the reliability interpretation. 327
Crawford was not just a case about confrontation
doctrine. It was also a case about whether and how well the
Supreme Court can provide guidance to other courts. The
conversion of Roberts from a decision requiring indicia of
reliability to a rule permitting the prosecutor to use hearsay
(Ill. App. Ct. 2005); State v. Wright, No. A03-1948, 2005 WL 147487, at *2-4 (Minn. Ct.
App. Jan. 25, 2005).
322
Allie Phillips, Child Forensic Interviews After Crawford v. Washington:
Testimonial or Not?, PROSECUTOR, July-Aug. 2005, at 17, 27-28.
323
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
324
Id.
325
See Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 546 (1986).
326
See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 827 (1990).
327
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62-65 (2004).
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after a judicial evaluation of reliability allowed other courts to
create the appearance of applying Supreme Court doctrine
without the reality. Justice Scalia showed the depth of the
problem in Crawford by comparing cases that showed how both
a fact and its opposite could be presented in different opinions
as evidence of reliability. 328 If Crawford succeeds in changing
confrontation doctrine, that change will come because it will no
longer be enough to declare that a statement is reliable for it to
be admissible.
By itself, rejecting the reliability test will not
necessarily eliminate the reasons that have led courts to admit
hearsay statements under their interpretation of Roberts.
After Crawford, those reasons might lead a court to declare a
statement nontestimonial. Whether that becomes the eventual
response may depend on how well and how quickly the Court
explains the principles other courts should use to recognize
that a statement is testimonial.
That still leaves open the question of whether
abandoning any confrontation protection for nontestimonial
statements would be the best way to bring certainty or stability
to confrontation doctrine. The appeal of the testimonial
interpretation as a bright-line test rests on the assumptions
that testimonial and nontestimonial statements are so clearly
different that they can be readily distinguished, that the
difference should be reflected in different confrontation
requirements, and that the historical record supports the
distinction and helps make the distinction. The opinions of
other courts have shown that the distinctions are not easy to
make, particularly without any articulated principle to guide
the analysis. 329
For example, an alleged accomplice may make
accusations against a defendant in settings other than
custodial interrogation. Some may be made in wholly private
settings. If the difference in the setting for the accusation is
the controlling factor, which category would be proper when an
alleged accomplice makes the accusation in an apparently
private setting that is actually a covert interrogation by an
acquaintance who has agreed to be recorded by the police?
Should the knowledge or expectation of the interrogator or the

328

Id. at 63.
See, e.g., State v. Wright, 701 N.W.2d 802, 811-12 (Minn. 2005); Davis v.
State, 169 S.W.3d 660, 668-72 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005).
329
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accomplice govern whether the defendant has a right of
confrontation?
An
accomplice’s
accusation
during
custodial
interrogation, a similar statement to a covert interrogator, and
a similar private statement can be equally damaging to the
defendant. The absence of the declarant from trial would mean
that the defendant’s inability to confront the declarant would
be the same for all three statements. The already apparent
search for ways to step around the holding of Crawford would
likely produce one immediate response if future decisions
establish that statements produced by covert interrogation are
nontestimonial: the number of covert interrogations would
increase. Covert interrogation would become much more
valuable because the resulting product could be used without
confrontation if the declarant became unavailable.
Crawford did not hold that private hearsay statements
do not require some confrontation limits. The statement by
Justice Scalia about nontestimonial statements left open three
possibilities – flexibility under Roberts, flexibility under some
rule similar to Roberts, or no need for any confrontation
analysis. 330 As Justice Breyer did in his concurring opinion in
Lilly, 331 Justice Scalia has left a question that calls for further
examination.
B.

Roots of a Pro-Confrontation Interpretation

Was it necessary to abandon the text of the
Confrontation Clause so quickly in trying to interpret and
apply it?
The primary reason it has been treated as
insufficient is that it does not provide any detailed instructions
about how it should be applied. The adoption process does not
provide much help either because neither the ratification
debates nor the record of the first Congress contain any
detailed instructions. The “faded parchment” image then
suggests that applying history, policy, or some combination is
all that is possible. That appears to inevitably lead to the
balancing approach rejected by Crawford.
The alternative is to accept both the text and the record
of the adoption process at face value. The Framers provided no
detailed information and knew they were not providing

330
331

Id. at 68.
Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 142-43 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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complete instructions. Speakers such as Abraham Holmes
provided no detail because they were not lawyers and lacked
the experience to provide details. The absence of any evidence
that the comments of the nonlawyers were corrected by judges
or lawyers is itself evidence that those who might have thought
about the actual application of the confrontation principle saw
no need to speak. There is no evidence anyone discussed what
the right of confrontation might mean if the hearsay rule
withered away because the hearsay rule was not essential to
the right of confrontation.
The ratification debates were about a political idea. The
ratification debates explain why there is a Confrontation
Clause. The discussion of confrontation in the ratification
process and the inclusion of the right of confrontation in the
Sixth Amendment provide some evidence that confrontation
was a politically important idea.
The political idea of
confrontation was left undefined in its details. So were many
political ideas such as religion, speech, search, seizure,
jeopardy, counsel, and bail. If the Framers saw that the Sixth
Amendment did not define confrontation, then using English
common law to fill in the details of confrontation may not be
using the meaning of the Framers. Suggesting that they
meant something in-between inevitably becomes a search for
hearsay the Framers would have permitted or excluded. That
search cannot avoid the assumption that the evolution of the
hearsay rule was part of the original meaning as well. Is it
possible to ask what the Confrontation Clause might mean
without a hearsay rule?
American hearsay law and the right of confrontation
have been so intertwined for so long that it may seem
impossible to think about confrontation by itself. It can be
done, however. The European Court of Human Rights has
been developing a right of confrontation that applies across the
Continent to national court systems that do not recognize a
hearsay rule. 332 The European confrontation right they are
developing does not necessarily suggest how the Supreme
Court should interpret the Sixth Amendment. It is important
as an example that it is possible to consider confrontation and
hearsay separately.

332
See generally Roger W. Kirst, Hearsay and the Right of Confrontation in
the European Court of Human Rights, 21 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 777 (2003).
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There is a source for possible roots for an alternative
interpretation of the Confrontation Clause in the Supreme
Court’s decisions.
Some Justices have employed a proconfrontation approach to the Clause that has gotten too little
notice for the way it differs from the more common antihearsay approach. The first time the Court mentioned the
purpose of the Clause was in Mattox v. United States. 333 In
Mattox Justice Brown described the Clause’s “primary object”
as “to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits.” 334 That antihearsay description was sufficient on the facts of Mattox
because the hearsay was prior testimony from the defendant’s
first trial. 335 The witnesses had died before the second trial, 336
but the fact that the defendant had cross-examined them at the
first trial meant that the evidence had not been taken ex
parte. 337
Four years later Justice Harlan did not use that antihearsay perspective in Kirby v. United States. 338 Kirby was a
prosecution for receiving stolen federal property. A federal
statute provided that the judgment of conviction of the thief
would be conclusive evidence in the trial of the alleged receiver
that the property had been stolen. 339 At trial, the prosecution
had proved that the property was stolen by introducing the
conviction record of the thieves and invoking the statute. In
his opinion for the Court, the first Justice Harlan reviewed
English precedent and state decisions before concluding that
the statute violated the Confrontation Clause. 340 He explained
that the statute was unconstitutional because it allowed the
prosecutor to prove an element of the crime with the record
from a different trial, instead of by calling a witness to testify
about the facts. 341 He also explained that the conviction record
was not admissible for any purpose because the fact that the
thief had been convicted was not an element of the crime of
receiving stolen property. 342
333
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In Kirby, Justice Harlan made no effort to fit the Mattox
model by describing the use of the conviction by the prosecution
as similar to trial by affidavit. Instead of using that antihearsay perspective, Justice Harlan described the purpose of
the Confrontation Clause from a pro-confrontation perspective
as intended to require the prosecution to call witnesses the
defendant could confront at trial. 343 He mentioned Mattox only
in stating that the circumstances of a dying declaration are
equivalent to testimony at trial. 344
Both
the
anti-hearsay
and
pro-confrontation
perspectives on the purpose of the Confrontation Clause
reappeared when the modern era of confrontation doctrine
began with Pointer v. Texas in 1965. In that case, Justice
Black described the purpose from a pro-confrontation
perspective when he wrote that a “major reason underlying the
constitutional confrontation rule is to give a defendant charged
with crime an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses
against him.” 345 On the same day, Justice Brennan used a proconfrontation perspective in Douglas v. Alabama, where he
concluded that the Court’s confrontation cases “hold that a
primary interest secured by it is the right of crossexamination.” 346 In Barber v. Page, Justice Marshall used both
perspectives without suggesting they might be different. 347
When Justice Brennan wrote again in Bruton v. United States,
he described the Confrontation Clause as directed against
evidence that cannot be tested by cross-examination, but he
cited only Justice Black’s opinion in Pointer and not his own
opinion in Douglas. 348
The last appearance of the pro-confrontation perspective
was no more than implicit and easily overshadowed by the
Mattox anti-hearsay perspective. In Green, Justice White
stated that “it is this literal right to ‘confront’ the witness at
the time of trial that forms the core of the values furthered by
the Confrontation Clause.” 349 He followed that statement with
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the quotation from Mattox that the object of the Clause was to
prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits. 350
Even as the pro-confrontation perspective was
disappearing after Green, a related concept was first appearing
in Dutton. In his lead opinion in Dutton, Justice Stewart
described the hearsay statement as spontaneous and against
penal interest. 351 He labeled those circumstances as “indicia of
reliability” which allowed the prosecution to use the hearsay
even though the defendant could not confront the declarant. 352
He cited no precedent for his statement that indicia of
reliability were “widely viewed as determinative” of whether
hearsay could be used without confrontation. 353 Justice White
had used “indicia of reliability” in Green in a reference to
hearsay rules, 354 but the Court had never before used that
phrase in deciding whether there was a confrontation violation.
Dutton has long been the hardest case to reconcile with any
interpretation of the confrontation doctrine, but there is no
need to do so here. Dutton is important for a different idea.
In Dutton, Justice Stewart also drew from Justice
White’s opinion in Green in another way. Justice White had
said that confrontation at trial about an earlier statement “will
still afford the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating
the truth of the prior statement.” 355 In Dutton, Justice Stewart
used Justice White’s language in his own description that the
“mission of the Confrontation Clause is to advance a practical
concern for the accuracy of the truth-determining process in
criminal trials by assuring that ‘the trier of fact [has] a
satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior
statement.’” 356 Justice Stewart described how the defendant
had exercised his right to examine the witness who reported
the hearsay statement, an examination the jury had heard. He
concluded that the possibility that cross-examination of the
declarant “could conceivably have shown the jury that the
statement, though made, might have been unreliable was
wholly unreal.” 357 One thing was different – Justice White had
350
351
352
353
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described an effect of confrontation while Justice Stewart used
the same language to describe its purpose. One thing was the
same – both Justices focused on a basis for the factfinder to
evaluate reliability without mentioning reliability as a test for
the judge’s ruling on admissibility.
The last confrontation opinion from this era was written
by then-Justice Rehnquist in Mancusi v. Stubbs. 358 In Mancusi,
the hearsay was testimony from a prior trial by a witness who
was in Sweden and unavailable at the time of the second
Justice Rehnquist quoted both the “indicia of
trial. 359
reliability” language from Dutton 360 and the language about
affording “the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating
the truth of the prior statement” from Green. 361 Justice
Rehnquist listed both items jointly in his summary of Green
and Dutton and in his conclusion. 362
Justice Blackmun relied on Mancusi twice in Roberts.
In discussing the facts of Roberts in Part III, Justice Blackmun
explained why examining the declarant at the pretrial hearing
was sufficient. He said that both the opportunity and use of
the opportunity to examine meant that the transcript had
“sufficient indicia of reliability” and that it “afforded the trier of
fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior
statement.” 363 For that proposition Justice Blackmum cited
Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in Mancusi for its quotation from
Dutton, which in turn had quoted the language from Green. 364
Justice Blackmun also relied on Mancusi when he set
out his general approach in Part II of Roberts. He quoted the
language from Mancusi that required both indicia of reliability
and a satisfactory basis for the trier of fact to evaluate the
truth of the statement. However, Justice Blackmun also
framed reliability from another perspective when he described
the “underlying purpose” of the Clause as “to augment accuracy
in the factfinding process by ensuring the defendant an
effective means to test adverse evidence.” 365 Justice Blackmun
described some hearsay exceptions as resting upon such a solid
358
359
360
361
362
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foundation that virtually any evidence they allow would
comport with the substance of the constitutional protection. He
cited Mattox and added a footnote that described a dying
declaration, cross-examined prior-trial testimony, and business
As always, more
and public records as illustrations. 366
discussion in the opinion might resolve some ambiguities, but
the context can be read as an argument by Justice Blackmun
that the firmly rooted hearsay exceptions he listed were ones
that would still ensure the defendant an effective means to test
adverse evidence and afford the trier of fact a satisfactory basis
for evaluating the truth of the statement.
The Court’s best opportunity to develop the implications
of the thinking behind Justice Blackmun’s general theory was
Lee v. Illinois. 367 In the majority opinion in Lee, Justice
Brennan quoted the language from Roberts about providing the
defendant with an effective means to test adverse evidence. 368
In his dissent in Lee, Justice Blackmun quoted the language
from Roberts about affording the trier of fact a satisfactory
basis for evaluating the truth of the statement. 369 Neither
Justice gave those quotations any further attention as they
debated other issues in the case.
The idea that the trier of fact should have a basis for
evaluating a statement did not completely disappear. For
example, in Inadi Justice Powell explained why the prosecutor
did not have to show the unavailability of the declarant of a coconspirator statement. 370 He emphasized that the evidentiary
significance of the particular evidence could not be replicated
by having the declarant repeat it as testimony at trial. His
argument was strengthened by the fact that the specific coconspirator statements in Inadi had been captured on tape by
the police. 371 That meant the jury could actually listen to the
defendants conspiring, possibly the closest practical equivalent
to having the jury view the crime in progress. Justice Powell
did not discuss how the defendant could test the evidence, but
his emphasis on the evidentiary value and significance of coconspirator statements appear to assume that the trier of fact
will evaluate the statements they heard being made.
366
367
368
369
370
371
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The Supreme Court’s recent precedent on courtroom
confrontation has also emphasized that the purpose of
confrontation is to allow the trier of fact to evaluate the
evidence. In Coy v. Iowa, Justice Scalia described the Clause
as a guarantee that the defendant would have “a face-to-face
meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier of fact.” 372 In
Maryland v. Craig, Justice O’Connor described the purpose of
the Confrontation Clause in similar terms as ensuring that
evidence be subjected “to rigorous testing in the context of an
adversary proceeding before the trier of fact.” 373 The Chief
Justice quoted that same language from Craig in his
concurring opinion in Crawford. 374
Chief Justice Rehnquist relied on the Inadi analysis
when he discussed excited utterances and statements for
medical diagnosis in White. 375 He described the contexts in
which such statements are made as providing substantial
guarantees of trustworthiness that support the hearsay
exceptions. In addition to describing firmly rooted exceptions
as satisfying the confrontation test, the Chief Justice made a
second point. He described a statement made in a moment of
excitement without an opportunity to reflect as possibly
carrying more weight with a trier of fact than testimony. 376 The
Chief Justice described a statement for medical diagnosis
where the declarant knows that a false statement may cause
misdiagnosis or mistreatment as having guarantees of
credibility “that a trier of fact may not think replicated by
courtroom testimony.” 377 He did not discuss whether the
defendant would have any way to test such evidence, but for
both kinds of statements he explicitly stated that the trier of
fact would evaluate each statement.
Various
combinations
of
the
pro-confrontation
perspective have persisted in the Court’s confrontation
doctrine. That helps explain why Justice Scalia in Crawford
could describe the results of the Court’s decisions as not
inconsistent with his interpretation that the original meaning
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did not include a reliability exception to the right of
confrontation.
The pro-confrontation perspective is not inconsistent
with the holding of Crawford, but Justice Scalia’s emphasis on
his anti-hearsay interpretation meant that the proconfrontation perspective was only an implicit part of his
declaration that there could be no substitute for confrontation
for a testimonial statement. On the facts of Crawford, both
perspectives lead to the same result.
V.

REBUILDING CONFRONTATION DOCTRINE AFTER
CRAWFORD

Confrontation doctrine can be rebuilt after Crawford,
but a successful approach will avoid the obvious invitation to
use historical research to produce a more precise definition of
testimonial and nontestimonial hearsay. The reason other
courts were reaching incorrect conclusions before Crawford was
not just Roberts and not just the reliability test. Each played a
role, but eliminating both did not get to the root of the problem.
The problem began with the longstanding failure to question
the assumption of both Justice Harlan and Justice Blackmun
that the purpose of the Confrontation Clause was excluding
certain kinds of hearsay. Without that assumption, the
historical record does not compel using the testimonial
interpretation as the foundation for confrontation doctrine.
An alternative interpretation would read the
Confrontation Clause literally as requiring confrontation. That
interpretation would not change the effect of the Clause as a
limit on the use of hearsay evidence by the prosecution. It
would describe a common purpose for the effect of the Clause
on hearsay, as well as its effect on the ability of the prosecution
to use testimony from a witness who refuses to answer
questions on cross-examination. It would also set forth a
common purpose for its effect on testimony from a witness
hidden behind a screen, and its effect on taking testimony
while the defendant is excluded from the courtroom. It would
avoid the apparent discordance of describing the purpose of the
Clause as only one of the several effects it has on criminal
trials.
Interpreting the Confrontation Clause as requiring
confrontation would not mean that a prosecutor could never
present any evidence about out-of-court statements. The
Supreme Court opinions that have identified two elements of
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the right of confrontation would allow the prosecution to use an
out-of-court statement if those two elements are met: the
defendant must have an effective means to contest the evidence
and the trier of fact must be able to assess the evidence.
There are two questions to ask about any interpretation
of the Confrontation Clause or Crawford. The first is whether
it is consistent with the Court’s established confrontation
doctrine. The second is how well it provides guidance for issues
that have not yet been decided. Subpart A will describe how
interpreting the Clause as requiring confrontation is more than
just consistent with every Court opinion including Crawford; it
can also be helpful in understanding the limits of some of the
opinions. Subpart B will sketch how interpreting the Clause as
requiring confrontation can provide guidance for addressing
the issues left unanswered by Crawford.
A.

Understanding Established Confrontation Doctrine

The rules the Supreme Court has applied in prior cases
for several kinds of hearsay are consistent with the Court’s two
elements of confrontation. For example, the established rule
that allows the prosecution to use the prior testimony of an
unavailable witness requires showing that there had been
actual cross-examination of the witness at the prior hearing.
The Court explained that prior cross-examination is the feature
that ensures that the defendant has an effective means to
contest the evidence in both Green 378 and Roberts. 379 The
transcript of the examination and cross-examination will
provide the jury with a basis for evaluating the prior
testimony.
The established rule that allows the prosecution to use
any prior statements of a witness at trial requires that the
defendant be able to cross-examine the witness at trial about
the prior statement. In Part II of Green, the Court explained
that cross-examination at trial gives the defendant an effective
means to contest the evidence and provides the jury with a
basis for evaluating the prior statement. 380
The established rule that allows the prosecution to use a
co-conspirator statement that was made in the course and
scope of the conspiracy applies to statements that have the
378
379
380
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evidentiary significance described in Inadi 381 and Bourjaily. 382
While both Inadi and Bourjaily involved recorded statements
that could be played for the jury, neither opinion treated that
fact as important. Both opinions described co-conspirator
statements in general as having evidentiary significance the
jury can evaluate. 383
The established rule that allows the prosecution to use
an excited utterance may apply only to truly immediately
excited statements if the Court accepts Justice Scalia’s footnote
in Crawford 384 as a refinement of White. 385 Without the
declarant as a witness, the prosecution would have to present
the statement through the testimony of someone who was
present to hear it. If the statement immediately follows the
startling event, the witness will be present for the startling
event to observe the context of the statement. That testimony
would give the defendant an effective means to contest the
evidence and the jury a basis for evaluating the statement.
Requiring immediacy would prevent using the excited
utterance exception to admit reports of past crimes; however,
no Supreme Court decision supports that use of the exception.
The inability of the defendant to ask the witness at trial about
the context of a startling event they did not observe and the
inability of the factfinder to evaluate that context explain why
the Court might hold that immediacy is a condition for
satisfying the right of confrontation.
The established rule that allows the prosecution to use a
statement that was made for medical care could still be refined
by the Court. The outer limits of the rule were not defined in
White because the Court in that case did no more than assume
the statements properly fit within the hearsay exception. 386
Perhaps White would have been decided differently if it had
been heard after the Court held in Williamson that a hearsay
statement must be parsed to admit only the portion that is
against the declarant’s penal interest. 387 Then the Court in
White might have given more attention to parsing the medical
care statements into those that were relevant to the need for
381
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actual medical care and those that were relevant only to other
purposes such as law enforcement. For a statement specifically
relevant to medical care, the context, purpose, and significance
of the statement could be reported by the medical personnel
who heard it. That would mean there would be a factual basis
that would give the defendant an effective means to contest the
statement and would give the jury a basis for evaluating the
statement.
Out-of-court statements offered for some purpose other
than proving the truth of the assertion should generally not
raise a confrontation issue. 388 The Supreme Court has not held
that the scope of the confrontation right is limited to the
definition of hearsay in Federal Rule of Evidence 801(c), but
the Court has suggested there is no confrontation issue if a
statement is not used to prove the truth of the matter
asserted. 389 Testimony that provides background or explains
the significance of an event can be attacked by the defendant
and evaluated by the factfinder whether or not it involves a
prior statement if the statement is not being used for a hearsay
purpose. That does not mean that other courts could use the
kind of strained misinterpretation of when evidence is being
used for a hearsay purpose that had permitted the use of codefendant plea allocutions that was criticized in Crawford. 390
Interpreting the Clause as requiring confrontation
would leave some incomplete areas of confrontation doctrine
unchanged. For example, the current interpretation that the
Clause allows the prosecution to introduce a dying declaration
would remain undefined for the same reason this rule was not
fully defined before Crawford – the Supreme Court has never
decided a case involving a dying declaration. The forfeiture
rule would remain partially defined because the Supreme
Court’s only application of the forfeiture principle in United
States v. Reynolds considered only a single set of facts. 391
Interpreting the Clause as requiring confrontation
would not change the conclusions in Lee, 392 Lilly, 393 and
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Crawford 394 that those custodial statements against penal
interest were inadmissible because the accomplice did not
testify. It would not change the holding in Wright that the
victim’s report was inadmissible. 395 In all of these cases the
defendant’s inability to confront the declarant left the
defendant with no effective means to contest the out-of-court
statement and provided the factfinder without a sufficient
basis to evaluate the truth of the out-of-court statement.
B.

Addressing Future Issues

The categories the Supreme Court has found admissible
and clearly inadmissible include a substantial percentage of
the hearsay that typically is contested.
Nevertheless,
confrontation doctrine is still a work in progress. There are
gaps in the established rules for hearsay such as business
records and official records. The previously established rules
may not provide clear answers for statements made possible by
911 calls or statements in developing areas of the law such as
domestic abuse cases. There is no reason to expect that
Crawford will directly answer every question about
confrontation doctrine.
The importance of a precise distinction between
testimonial and nontestimonial statements will not be
apparent until the Court defines the rule for nontestimonial
statements. The difficulty of defining a rule for nontestimonial
statements will depend on whether the Court tries to announce
a single comprehensive rule or decides that it can develop a set
of rules in the common law manner by addressing the facts of
one particular case at a time. Crawford did not endorse any
rule the Supreme Court must follow when it eventually does
address the right of confrontation for nontestimonial hearsay.
When it does, Crawford suggests the Court may ask whether
other courts have developed a coherent body of doctrine that is
consistent with the purpose of the Confrontation Clause.
Other courts, prosecutors, and defense counsel have
resources they can use to understand and apply Crawford
while they must wait for the Supreme Court to provide further
guidance. They can address the most important issues by
recognizing that the Confrontation Clause was adopted to
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require confrontation and not just to exclude hearsay. They
can consider whether admitting the particular kind of hearsay
would be consistent with that purpose by focusing on the
defendant’s ability to contest the evidence and whether the
factfinder has a sufficient basis for evaluating the truth of a
prior statement. That interpretation does not lead to the
judicial screening for reliability that was rejected in Crawford.
The questions are not whether the trial judge thinks the
defendant needs to contest the evidence or whether the trial
judge can evaluate the truth of the hearsay.
The Supreme Court could best continue its development
of confrontation doctrine by interpreting the Confrontation
Clause to require confrontation and focusing on the two
elements of confrontation to decide whether the prosecution
can use a particular kind of hearsay. That interpretation
would recognize that the adoption of the Confrontation Clause
in the Sixth Amendment gave the courts both the duty to
protect the right of confrontation and the responsibility to
reevaluate confrontation doctrine as evidence law might
change.
Justice Scalia declared in Crawford that the Court had
to reject the reliability exception in order to make confrontation
doctrine consistent with the historical record. Chief Justice
Rehnquist argued that the Court did not have to freeze
confrontation doctrine with a new categorical rule. Despite
their apparent debate in Crawford, perhaps they were both
right.

